After approval … the law of Popular crowd raises the controversy

After approval … the law of Popular crowd raises the controversy

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Passing of the popular crowd Act in  the last November 26  by the Iraqi Council of Representatives  was deemed a great gain to the Shiite factions   engaged in the  popular crowd, but sharp differences that started to come out into the open between the leaders of those factions and Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi on the law itself, showing the dissatisfaction of prominent leaders of the armed factions loyal to Iran’s regime of privileges and benefits granted to the crowd, and that those leaders will not be satisfied  for less than the conversion of its factions to “revolutionary guards” similar to  the Iranian  example .

The essence of the dispute between them is centered on the issue that leadership of the crowd  is “upset”   with  the Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who  is from its  point of view , did not abide by  the draft law of the popular crowd , and submitted to the Iraqi parliament entirely different draft. The crowd’s leaders  see that the original draft  in which  the leaders  of factions agreed   with  al-Abadi   on its clauses which include  the equality  of the leaders and members of the popular crowd with leaders and employees of the defense and interior ministries in both the financial and armament receivables. While the Iraqi parliament approved the draft that states  to adapt the legal situation of the members  of the crowd according to the military hierarchy in terms of salaries, and this requires the issuance of new instructions from the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Although the draft, which the leaders of the popular crowd agreed with Haider al-Abadi does not include any reference to prevent its leaders, after the adoption of law, of political action, but the version approved by the Iraqi Council of Representatives include explicit statement that prevents every associate to the crowd from engaging in politics.

For his part, Haider Abadi, the Iraqi prime minister’s response to the  objection  of  these leaders to inform  them  that it has been formed a committee to develop instructions concerning salaries and arming of the formations  of popular crowd after the adoption of the law, but he also told them  that the salaries and privileges of the crowd will not be, in any case, equal to the salaries and privileges of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, justifying this  for the scarcity of funds, and that equality  between the  privileges of the crowd and security ministries will raise the angry of official military leaders.

Faced with this dispute ,  the leaders of  Shiite objecting factions proceeded  “Asaib ahl- Al-Haq, Hezbollah Brigades and the Brigades of Imam Ali, the Brigades of the al-khurasani, and Nujaba  in Iraq    in cooperation with the political blocs, in finding  the  way out of what they consider” impasse  “implied by the popular crowd Act and  this” impasse is ” from the perspective of those factions as stipulated in the Act concerning the assignment of the leadership of the crowd after its conversion to an independent military body within the Iraqi armed forces, to the Prime Minister, who is at the same  occupy the position of commander  in chief of the armed forces, and give him the power to move the troops of the crowd and choose  the positions of its locations and tasks entrusted to it . This will mean the withdrawal of factions from the hands of its leaders, which can not be accepted by those influential leaders and those who stand behind of  the politicians in any way,  due to the fact that factions representing their  striking hands  and their security  in their struggle to gain positions against opponents both from within the Shiite political home  or outside.

Prime Minister aims to make this  factions professional  belonging to the commander in chief  of the armed forces and not    merely  to follow him formally, and the elements  of factions to receive  instructions from him and not from the leaders of  their factions , and   thus  they  become an integral part of the Iraqi armed forces, which  are under the law   prohibited   from the political action, and this is  not accepted by the leaders of the factions  of  the popular crowd as they depend on them  in the next elections of   parliamentary and   provincial councils in Iraq.

In the face of  this  Abu mahdi al-Muhandis chaired  a meeting  which put forward several options, the first of it  is to amend   the text of the law of popular crowd  in order to achieve the demands that previously agreed upon with the Prime Minister. The second option is to engage  the pro-Iranian factions in  a small part of its brigades in the popular crowd, which will be formed under the new law, and  to retain the bulk of its troops out of these brigades. The main objective of this option is to avoid what could be the result from the dependency  of the troops of  popular crowd   to  the General Commander of the Armed Forces  in terms of loyalty, according to the rule that the fighter befriend to  the one  who pays his salary,  and it also allows the leaders of the armed factions to own fighters and influence away from the state, and facilitates the task of participation in political work. The last option  suggested  is the announcement about the  refusal of the factions fully to  engage their fighters in the formations of the popular crowd prescribed by law.

Political analysts consider that the first and third options are improbable, and  the second option is  likely to be closer to the achievement   , but it puts the leaders of the armed factions loyal to Iran in front of the fact that the largest influence  in the authority of  popular crowd , which will be formed after the adoption of the law   will be  for the Brigades of  Salam  which belong to the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who openly declared that he would ask all his fighters to engage in formations of the crowd, because he does not fear  from the absolute loyalty to him. And everyone knows that the number of the fighters of  Al- Salam Brigades , alone surpasses that of all other  fighters  of factions combined.

There is no doubt that the Iranian regime stands strongly with the factions  “displeased”   with Haidar Abadi, the Iraqi prime minister, because of this law according to its current  form does not serve its interests  as   it  requires noting that  it  seeks to   the triple reproduced : «the army, people and resistance» in Lebanon, and «the army , people   and  the popular crowd ” in Iraq. The Iranian regime is benefiting from his   «successful» experiences  and circulated it , and sees that  the  ability to serve its objectives in Lebanon  can be  moved  into Iraq and to other places, and vice versa. In Lebanon, the «golden equation»   was turned , that  Damascus and Tehran through «Hezbollah» forced the successive governments to adopt it, as it was referring to his role in the face of Israel ,  into an instrument to justify all the excesses of the party and internal policy of disruption that followed whenever  the political cards  were slipped away  from his hand, and then it turned into a way for «legislation» of its Foreign excesses and his involvement in  the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars , before it become a justification for placing the hand on the institutions and  take hold completely on the political decision. In practice, the  triple equation   was born   emptied  from  the other partners.  Regarding the «people» is only an « incubator environment » of the party, while  there is no consideration for the  opinion   and wishes of  the other components , and can be overcome and silenced by force of arms as happened in May 2008. While the powerless army  does not have to give up  about this role as    there  is the one who shares  him  of it , and  it  can not face the one who is stealing its task  because it affects its role and makes it a party to a civil confrontation supposedly to be  above of it .While «Hezbollah» tried in its  beginning to hide its sectarian orientations  putting himself  to belong   to the wider  current      «the conflict with Israel», hoping to attract some «Aerobien», then  returned  to abandon  the reservation either through the disclosure about his involvement in the  sectarian balances  inside Lebanon, or through raising sectarian slogans as a  title for his intervention in Syria, and the Iraqi «crowd»  did not  hesitate  since its inception in revealing about its   sectarian bright face , and the declaration of full loyalty to the Iranian regime over  arming and finance by Iran and delivering its leadership to the  officers of  «Revolutionary Guards». If the Lebanese army initially retain a margin of independence and is subject to political authority represented by the President of the Republic and the Minister of Defense,      in  which   factors interfere in its resolution   beyond from the  «Hezbollah» control , the question is about the need for the authorities in Baghdad allied with Tehran   ,   which owns an army  that it is taking hold  of his decision and looks like the army  which was built by Hafez al-Assad in Syria and made his senior officers are subject to those who are the lowest rank of   them if they are  from  a certain  component ,    to  the legislation of  «popular crowd» and considered  it as a «military system» and the allocation  of  a percentage for it from  the defense budget. As «Hezbollah»  was turned into a military power under the Iranian decision in Lebanon and Syria,  «the popular crowd» is preparing  to play a similar role in Iraq  in the service for the same goals.

We do not  ignore   the role of those who entered to  crowd  motivated  to face  «Daesh», but we must not forget the attempts to  marginalize  the Iraqi Army , filling the media means by the  victories of those formations  on the account of victories of  the army . What is the role of the Iranian officer Soleimani, who has become a real leader   of it, not just as an adviser as  said by  others ? Let’s hear what the deputy commander of «Saraya al-Khorasani», who  accused  the young Iraqis of the massacres of Aleppo:  saying «The Haj Kassem has made   men and  managed to find heroes, and if  the Haj Kassem was not present , those heroes  would not  be existed  .»  If the leader of the crowd thinks  in this way of thinking  ,  Do you  think  that he acknowledges  of a status  or manhood for  the Iraqi army  ?!  Political analysts see that it was better for him  to cancel the crowd,  and to join  those who wish to join the army  according to national  controls , but to join them   on a sectarian basis and religious marja, this makes it  away  of the national   principles , sought  by the  Iranian regime , each group returns to its religious marja   or  its   political channel outside  the boundaries.

The Iranian regime is seeking through the  law of popular crowd and armed factions in Iraq to entrench the culture of “armed groups” in the Iraqi society and push to the  growing  of this phenomenon in the whole region, which deepens the chaos and weaken the function of states and increases the differences, and the history of the popular crowd and the circumstances of its inception   and its  outside association  with the Iranian regime,  deepen its intervention in Iraqi affairs and increases the spirit of «sectarian revenge”. This crowd, on the assumption that it was useful, at some stage against terrorism would be a burden on the Iraqi people with its large numbers and  the loyalty of political  doctrine   may spoil the political life and turning it into a «centers of power»  that are conflicting  and dries the sources of the civic culture and «camped» the community and encourage other communities to create «crowds »to protect itself, and then Iraq becomes a country ruled by armed factions« gangs » which is working for the interests of its founders, regardless of the interests of the homeland. The central question: Can the Iraqi political forces  to « control » the crowd in a law that  would  put it  under the control of the state or the ruling powers want it as  a power is driven by it   at any time it want  out of the state system ? And what about the position of the neighboring countries of what is happening in Iraq?

 

Rawabet Center for  Research and Strategic Studies