Activating Turkey’s role in the Syrian crisis
As Turkey is the most important regional player in the Middle East, its foreign policy has a significant influence on the Middle East, this has made Turkey adopt a new foreign policy towards the region based on overcoming differences and strengthening relations but Turkey’s foreign policy orientations within its regional context have faced many challenges, Most notably the Arab Spring waves, which confused Turkey and highlighted the difference in its position on this popular movement from one country to another, in addition to Turkey’s failure to deal with the Syrian crisis by the soft power of the diplomatic agent. [27]
Which has made Turkey to play contradictory roles in many points of its foreign policy and crystallize it in line with the Turkish interests in the region, especially in the Syrian case, despite Turkey’s recognition that one of the most prominent principles of its foreign policy orientations is the absence of military intervention in the Arab Spring countries but Turkey intervened militarily in northern Syria in a Euphrates shield operation because of the growing strength of the Democratic union Party in Syria, which represents an extension of the PKK and Turkey’s fear of its influence on Turkish Kurds, especially after announcing the establishment of a federation in northern Syria, as well as fighting ISIS for fear of spreading to Turkey across the Syrian border , on the other hand, Turkey is supporting the Syrian opposition forces and helping to control the border areas adjacent to Turkey. [28]
The Arab Spring revolutions were not the only factor behind Turkey’s change in its foreign policy orientations in the Syrian crisis. The failed coup attempt in Turkey represented one of Turkey’s most prominent turning points in dealing with the Syrian file. This failed coup attempt mixed many of Turkey’s foreign policy orientations including Its policies its traditional allies, which resulted in a decline in Turkish-American relations because of the US position on the attempted coup d’état in which Turkey saw it as a collusion with the coup attempt, in return , a rapprochement in the Turkish-Russian relations, a rapprochement through which Turkey sought compensation the economic losses suffered after the crisis in Russia and the disruption of the flow of Russian tourists to Turkey, which represented revenues of more than 4 billion dollars, as well as the freezing of many energy projects between Turkey and Russia. Enhancing the Iranian –Turkish rapprochement despite the clear competition between them in the region nothing THAT Iran condemned the failed coup attempt in Turkey which expressed the desire of both parties to achieve economic convergence between them. [29]
Especially since Turkey is the largest importer of natural gas, where Turkey imports 16% of Iran and 26% of Iranian oil, making it one of the largest importers of energy from Iran, the rapprochement in Turkish relations with Russia and Iran through which Turkey aimed to consolidate relations and not limited to one axis, and to have an important position in the international arena. [30] This rapprochement also clearly demonstrated the change in Ankara’s attitude toward the Syrian crisis, which emerged in an attempt by Turkey to reach a political solution to the Syrian crisis with Russia and to deal flexibly with Assad’s future in the transitional phase. This led to a divergence in the Turkish position with Qatar and Saudi Arabia opposing the Russian and Iranian attitude, supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad [31]
This rapprochement does was activated more through Turkey’s avoidance to interfere in Aleppo despite its declared support for the opposition in Syria, and only by charging Bashar al-Asad with responsibility for the humanitarian catastrophe in Aleppo because of Turkey’s reluctance to restore tension in relations with Russia, with some sort of balance amid strained relations with the EU and the United States of America. [32]
The Turkish position from Aleppo was supported by Iran, which is Russia’s most prominent ally. It has read the change in the Turkish position from the Syrian crisis, although it recognizes that Turkey will not give up its position completely, but Iran is trying to convince Turkey that the conflict in Syria is not a zero-conflict and the existence some kind of cooperation between Turkey and Iran may open the door to many solutions to this crisis in an attempt of Iran to weaken the Turkish consensus with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the US states to have more time for the maneuver in the Syrian file, Iran sees the fall of Aleppo as a point to spread its Shiite influence and boost it. [33]
The effectiveness of the Turkish role in the Syrian crisis may be highlighted by the fact that there are many developments that are compatible with the Turkish interests in the Middle East region in general and Syria in particular, as well as its interests with the international and regional powers. It is expected the following:
1 / Large losses for Russia forced to accelerate access to resolve the crisis in Syria in cooperation with Turkey :
Russia, since its military intervention in Syria has been severely damaged, these losses have increased in the year 2015 after the death of Russian pilot Oleg Bechkov following the Turkish overthrow of the Russian Sukhoi 24 aircraft near the Syrian-Turkish border. In 2016, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the death of two Russian pilots following the crash of a Russian helicopter and the killing of Russian soldiers. The cost of Russian military intervention in Syria is high. The cost of Russian flight is $ 12,000 per hour, and the cost of the rockets is $ 750,000 while the spending of Russia on its troops in Syria is about $ 440,000. [34]
The high costs of Russian intervention in Syria and the continued crisis within Syria and the entry of Syria
in a situation similar to the guerrilla warfare that it could lead to an increase in Russian casualties and increase Russian fears
from the Involvement in Syria as previously involved in Afghanistan, which may prompt Russia to accelerate in
Search for a solution to the Syrian crisis in cooperation with Turkey. [35]
Russia’s endeavor to the engagement with Turkey in reaching a solution to the Syrian crisis may be linked to Russia’s certainty of Turkey ‘s ability in the direction of the Syrian opposition, as well as Russia’s desire to maintain openness in relations with Turkey, which will lead to the continuation of the “TurkStream pipeline ” project, Gas pipeline project , which carries Russian gas to Turkey , including Europe . [36]
2. The progress of Syrian opposition supported by a Turkey:
The success of the armed opposition in Syria, its progress in the field and the continued support of Turkey to the opposition may lead to the activation of its role in the crisis and its superiority over the Bashar al-Assad regime, especially in the case of deep divisions in the Syrian army leading to its collapse and thus victory of the opposition and to reach a solution to the Syrian crisis compatible with Turkish orientation. [37]
3 / Turkey and Iran reached a solution to the crisis :
Despite the differences between the Turkish and Iranian positions on the Syrian crisis and the great ideological differences between them, and their attempts to lead the Middle East region, their common interests and concerns have created a kind of cooperation between them, especially on the economic side, and the two countries adopting joint economic projects. This convergence may develop to include political rapprochement, Especially with regard to the Syrian crisis, which may be realized because of the common concerns between the two countries, where to reach a solution to the crisis in Syria may be a solution for it or even mitigate the threat to the national security of Turkey and Iran, Iran is located in unstable environment (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). The continuation of tension in Syria may threaten the national security of Iran and increase its fear of the spread of terrorist groups to its territory, especially the “ISIS” or organization of the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria, which is also feared by Turkey, as well as the growing role of the Kurds of Syria , this is something that Turkey is deeply concerned about, but this does not prevent Iranian fear of it because of the existence of a Kurdish minority in Iran . [38]
Fourth: The future of Turkish strategy in the Middle East
There has been increasing interest in the Turkish role in the Middle East and its issues, especially after the AKP came to power, and the new government leaders are keen to confirm their adoption of a different vision of Turkey’s policy and foreign relations in various circles, especially in the Middle East. This interest has been reinforced by the positive developments witnessed by elements of the Turkish force in this period , especially in its economic dimensions, where Turkey succeeded in ranking first among the economies of the region and the sixteenth at the global level in terms of Gross domestic product associated with the increase in the presence of the Turkish role and its activity in many of the central issues in the region, whether with regard to the Iraqi issue or the Arab-Israeli conflict with multiple tracks or the crisis of the Iranian nuclear program, or put Turkey as a model in the reform issues in the region with its different dimensions and other Issues , Turkey’s regional role in the Middle East can be determined in the future by three main tracks , as follows: [39]
The first track: The growing Turkish role, this course is based on the assumption that the Turkish regional role will increase in the next stage in the light of the successes achieved by Turkey on securing political and economic stability and maintaining it towards an effective and influential regional role. Turkey will be a state of action and not a reaction. Turkey’s involvement in regional politics, international organizations and world politics will be developed. The achievement of this growing role depends on the following:
1 – Consistency and compatibility of Turkish foreign policy with US public policy, where Turkey is for the United States as the state model on which the United States should depend in the region, and this strengthens the degree of acceptance of the United States of Turkey’s growing role in the Middle East Turkey.
2 – The continued absence of influential regional powers in the Middle East, especially the Arab forces and the weakness of the Arab regional system.
3 – The decline of role played by the Turkish military institution under the slogans of change advocated by the AKP.and achieve more success
4 – Completing the internal reforms in the framework of peaceful solution of the Kurdish problem after that.
5 – The need of the United States of America and Western countries as well as Arab to the presence of an active Turkish role in the Middle East in order to create a state of strategic balance of the negative role of Iran in the region.
6 – Based on multiple relations and not limited to one axis and this gives Turkey a vital and important position in the regional arena.
7 – Continuation of popular support for the Turkish government in the pursuit of regional policy and in the form that believes in winning the parliamentary elections [40] .
The second track: the retreat of the Turkish role
This course assumes that Turkey’s regional role can not be achieved. Therefore, the objectives set by the Turkish government to develop a new policy of integrating foreign policy issues into one policy formulation framework, including the ability to pursue an integrated foreign policy to include multiple issues in the same context, it was not achieved in the required way that the matter requires to retreat from it and be restricted to the interior . The process of retreat of the regional role depends on the following:
1 – Increasing conflict between secularists and Islamists, in addition to the ethnic division between the Turks on any possible regional role and the Kurds and the aggravation of economic challenges in a way that negatively affects Turkey in the region.
2 – The failure of the Turkish government to achieve reconciliation with the Kurds, and this puts the government in front of a difficult examination with the military institution that wants to eliminate the PKK and therefore not to give the full rights of the Kurds.
3. The inability of the AK Party to retain the majority in the Turkish parliament in the parliamentary elections, which means the difficulty of forming the government by the party.
4 – A military coup by the Turkish military institution , which means going back and losing Turkey for its potential role.
5 – Diminished strategic importance of Turkey to the United States of America.
6. Turkey’s failure to present itself to bridge the East-West understanding.
The third track: the limited role of Turkey
This course focuses on the assumption that Turkey’s role will be secondary to Turkey’s ability to play an active role in major issues, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that there are regional players competing with Turkey in the Middle East,as well as the focus of Turkey on other regions such as the Balkans, Cyprus and the Caucasus which are more important to Ankara than the Middle East. The limited role of Turkey is based on the following: [41]
1 – Turkey’s inability to achieve the balance in its relations between Israel and its sympathy with the Islamic movements, especially Hamas and this may make it to lose the balance of the relationship between the moderates and extremists in the region, as Turkey’s position at an equal distance of them makes it in a balanced position in a way to support its regional role
2 – The inability of the successor of Erdogan in the presidency of the government to succeed in obtaining a popular base that enables Turkey to play its effective regional role.
3. The inability of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to carry out important reforms in the country’s constitution that gives Islam greater space in political work.
4. Increasing the sensitivities of other regional powers such as Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia will limit the effectiveness and impact of the Turkish role in the Middle East.
5 – The failure of Turkish attempts to join the European Union will stand as an obstacle for its performance as a mediator as a regional Turkish role in the Middle East.
6 – Turkish openness on Syria and developing relations with it is negatively reflected on indirect negotiations between Israel and Syria.
7 – the inability of Turkey to hold the Iraqi paper, which is one of the most important papers currently kept by Iran, and seeks to use it to support its regional influence and extract American recognition of this influence and it is not in Turkey’s interest to leave this paper to Iran, and Turkey did nit review its narrow calculations accurately on this level, the Kurdish node will remain the obstacle to its regional role .
. 8. The US administration defines the Turkish regional role. It may rely heavily on Turkey in Central Asia. The Americans now talk about Greater Central Asia. There is no talk of the Greater or New Middle East. Turkey will be the starting point for this and will be the base for the American strategy towards Central Asia. [42]
Conclusion:
Through our study, we conclude that the Middle East has become a hotbed of crises and the ambitions of major countries and regional countries, including Iran and Turkey, which seek to play a leading regional role more than during the Ottoman Empire.
Turkey’s increasing role in the Middle East since the arrival of the Development and Justice Party to power under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which had a significant impact on its foreign policy.
* Turkey’s outstanding regional status as well as the geographical proximity of the Arab region and the participation of its borders, which is considered a link between the continents of the world.
* Turkey seeks to exert its influence in the Middle East region and its efforts to play a prominent regional role through its strategic location, and its strategy and attitude towards the Arab revolutions and play a prominent role in the regional crises and response to the security threats witnessed in the region.
Tajani Dalal bin Faraj
Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies