Most of the Shiite militias were arisen , after the US occupation of Iraq in April / May 2003. This Militias receive military and financial support from the Iraqi government and the Iranian regime. These militias have worked under different covers, but remained not far from the knowledge of the political and security authorities and interacting with it, and these militias gained more power and authority, especially after the emergence of the organization Daash in the Iraqi security , military and the political scene in June 2014, and after a famous fatwa of the Supreme Shiite marja Ali Sistani, the need to take up arms to fight the organization . And Shi’ite factions on that date formed organizational framework under the name of the popular crowd to fight Daash, since its militia assisted to stop the march to the capital, Baghdad, when it swept through the north and west of the country in the summer of 2014,
This crowd has become a legal cover to these militias, which have been increased in number since that time to more than forty militia. Fight against Daash did not prevent it from committing crimes and abuses and sectarian systematic practices , in the Iraqi “Sunni” Arab provinces during and after the start of liberalization of the cities that have fallen in the grip of the organization Daash starting from the city of Tikrit in March 2015 until the battle of Fallujah in July 2016 .
In June 2015, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said that militias of the popular crowd is a part of the Iraqi security system, and he rejected being described by sectarianism, stressing that its funding comes from the government. The transformation of the popular crowd to the regular militias sponsored and trained by the Iraqi government , but they remained separate armed organizations , each with its leaders and the private organizational structure. The Iraqi authorities have been defending about the militias of the popular crowd of the continued accusations of war crimes in different areas against the Arab Sunni population, and committing violations in the areas seized from al Daash. That Haider Abadi, Iraq’s prime minister admitted for the violations of the crowd during his stay at the Munich conference, which was held in the month of February of this year, where he said “I think that there are groups produced by the popular crowd which are out the framework of the state and its control and we will not allow this, we will not allow the existence of any groups outside the framework of the state and we will fight it and eliminate it. ”
However, the project to establish the militias of the Popular crowed as a major influential and dominant military and security force in Iraq is going on in full swing, as a key part of the phases for the implementation of the Iranian project to export the Islamic Revolution; The Last indication of this matter was clear, under the decision of Iraqi Prime Minister and Commander of the armed forces , Haider al-Abadi, making the crowd “linked to general commander of the armed forces as an independent military formations”, in addition of making it as a model, “comparable to the anti-terrorism service in terms of organization and connection , as well as it was consisted of the leadership , General staff and the kinds of combat brigades.” Observers of Iraqi affairs believe that the leaders of the militias of the crowd are the body which leaked this decision to put Haider al-Abadi in critical situation . They see that Iraq is a country not governed by political disciplines but only governed by the desire of the governor and the mood of his party, but that the issue of the dependency of the popular crowd is no longer a matter of formality, but has its indications that reveal the complications of the position of the ruling parties and its internal conflicts that could be led by political situations after the Daash of multifaceted influence of the leaders of armed militias supported by Iran. Although Haider Abadi ‘s decision was restricted by the constitutional and legal complexity but he tried to circumvent on it, where the constitution prohibits any form of armed Militias out of the regular military forces, and perhaps the timing of the adoption of this decision coincides with the expected legislation to the lam law of the parties in Iraq which has not stopped sectarian parties to practice for activities contrary to the constitution, but preventing these parties be armed arms “armed militias”, as the decision is aimed at ridding the militia of this mess, so his decision was welcomed by all militia factions.
Other observers see that Haider al-Abadi’s decision is to trim toenails of the founder of the militias of popular crowd Nuri al-Maliki while others saw it as a procedure to put militia under the direct control of his office. While there are those who believe that the resolution is the beginning to deepen clearly the state of the political divide in Iraq, and the granting of criminal gangs and militia a permission to the murder and the destruction by using official identities and addresses , it also opened the doors for militias that fall under the multi-sectarian banners, to participate in the upcoming battle of Mosul, which all national, regional and international parties were refusing the participation of the crowd in it as the organization is to be considered as undisciplined organization , especially after widespread international criticism of these militias after large excesses committed against Sunni citizens in the provinces of Diyala, Salahuddin, Anbar and Babil (rock cliff), the last battle of Fallujah and its outskirts, as The decision of the annexation was a clear encouraging from an Iraqi sovereign position “Prime Minister” based on sectarian considerations associated with Iran’s interests.
According to proponents of this view within the decision , it appears to legitimize the Iranian interference in the affairs of the military and security operations in Iraq , in spite of all broad resentment aroused by this intervention amid of the Iraqi political elites. This seems clear from the positions of Iranian officials of this resolution, such as a call of the founder of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Gen. Mohsen Rafiq Dost, to repeat the Revolutionary Guard’s experience in Iraq, and his readiness to transfer its experience in this area, for the formation of an “Iraqi Revolutionary Guards,” that Tehran to contribute directly in the arming and training of its components, and the advice of a member of the Committee on national Security and Foreign policy in the Iranian Shura Council, MP Mohammad Júcar, to Iraq to implement Iranian experience regarding the “Revolutionary guards”, and saying, “We are ready to supply Iraqi troops with the pattern and structure of these forces , to enable Iraq to form its guard forces “.
In this context there is a partisan sectarian mobilization to enlarge the role of the militias of the popular crowd in the media in the battles for liberation against Daash while there is intentional neglect of the role of the Iraqi army , this crowed has become “the fifth-strongest strike force in the world,” according to a statement of one of its leaders to a reproduction of the argument described the Iraqi army during the war with Iran as a “fifth army in the world,” or according to the spokesman of the crowd, “if the crowd weren’t , probably Daash had entered Baghdad and toppled the government and parliament.” The all-partisan ,sectarian institutions in Iraq today are organized under one tactical line aim to qualify the crowd to become the first military and security force in the country, and the Iraqi army become formal alternative after spending on its rehabilitation $ 25 billion in 2015 alone. Against this , the exaggeration was intended .
The questions about the future of stability in Iraq are to follow in succession, and in conjunction with the significant progress in the war on organizing Daash towards ending its control over areas of the country. And a lot of analysis go towards something more probable that a defeat al Daash in Iraq would not represent the end of violence and the beginning of stability in the country because of the distortions in the political process, and errors in the way of state management and it suggests that the country to enter into new circles of instability, and perhaps of internal fighting with a huge amount of arms out of state hands and in the hands of tens of thousands of elements belonging to militias affiliated to bodies that are not consistent in its goals and objectives and interests.
The sharp political differences in Iraq are considered as a multiple factor of tension in the country, and those differences were culminated in recent months and came up from the traditional form as a differences between the main parties of Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, and went to a split between the ruling Shiite parties within the National Alliance, which raises concerns of some to the occurrence of fighting between the armed factions of those parties .In the midst of political controversies and protests that accompanied it , armed militias of the Shiite political parties had been preparing and watching the scene closely .
And the scene of the political conflict between the Shiite component within the National Alliance, according to those who are pursuing of the Iraq affairs , has brought back the fears of a return to fighting in the capital Baghdad, especially since the armed Shiite factions began to emerge publicly in the streets of the city, since the invasion of the organization of Daash to the north and west of the country about two years ago. And fears were began to prevail that fighting between the armed forces of the Shiite wings within the Shiite National Alliance are probably to break out .Experience according to those involved in the Iraqi issue is present in the history of the Shiite factions, it is the experience in 2006 to 2008 when clashes between the Sadrists and the Badr were occurred .
And the high deployment of militias and their headquarters in Baghdad raises fears of many, and the followers of the Iraqi affairs see that the Shiite militias armed with all sorts and kinds of weapons will remain the greatest threat to Iraq’s stability in the post-Daash, even if it has become part of the military state institutions, because its weapons would not be under the authority of the state and its leaders and members would not hesitate when it is required to defend about the interests of the people and the parties that are not necessarily consistent with the public interest and national goals .
Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies