Drones are currently the “hot weapons.” They occupy roughly the same position as Patriot missiles after the first Gulf war, (1) sea-skimming anti-ship missiles after the Falklands War, (2) aircraft carriers after the Second World War, and submarines after the First World War. Every country’s military wants to have them, sees a use for them and wants them now. These factors are global, but they are attenuated in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states – traditionally among the most eager adapters of new military equipment and always interested in military capacity that does not require big investments of manpower.
Military requirements have driven scientific advances from the earliest time in history. The forging of metal was used in weapons; the first large scale factories produced cannons for French kings; the first use of interchangeable parts in machinery was the British military’s “Brown Bess” musket. The internet started as an initiative by the US army, and many other technological advances owe their genesis to military research.
What history has shown is that if new technology has a definite military application, then those nations which field the new technology will have an advantage over nations that do not. When new military technology is successfully used in combat, all militaries rush to acquire it for themselves. A good example is the rapid development of chemical weapons by nearly all countries after they were introduced in World War I.
Hot weapons
For some time now, the “hot” weapon has been aerial drones. The United States has conducted stand-alone drone operations for years in otherwise denied areas such as Pakistan and Yemen. Israel, Iran and Turkey have shown that even smaller countries can have an outsized effect by using drones. Drones have been used successfully by a multitude of state and non-state actors. They do not require a nation to develop a cadre of pilots at great expense; they are relatively easy to acquire or build; and they make it possible for any determined group of people to have a real air power capability.
In the wake of the Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure, (3) countries, even relatively small ones, realised drones could have a strategic effect with minimal risk. Drones are well-suited for obscuring the origin of an attack. There is no danger of a captured pilot, no tell-tale launch signature as with ballistic missiles, and the flight path of a drone cannot be mathematically extended backwards to determine the point of launch as with missiles.
Advanced militaries have, in the last fifty years, gotten use to controlling the sky. The last time the US army did not have control of the air was during the Korean War; (4) and the Russian armed forces have not fought without air control since World War II. An air attack — even a “nuisance attack” from a small drone — is something that most conventional armies are not used to dealing with.
Finally, there is just a general tendency among soldiers to search for and acquire the “latest and greatest” weaponry. The stakes in combat are high, and no soldier wants to take a chance under these circumstances. If the technology seems proven, then it is a universal desire of every soldier to have new equipment. No one can afford to be caught on the wrong side of a technological development. A sudden improvement in an enemy’s technology can quickly translate into a military vulnerability. Given that drones are now proven technology, we can expect every military to seek to acquire and field them.
Appealing to GCC fascination with the “glitter factor”
Most of the GCC states have long sought to develop world class military capability by acquiring world class equipment, often to the detriment of other elements of military capability such as establishing a functioning personnel system. Some Gulf analysts have gone as far as to attribute defence acquisition decisions to pure novelty, referring to the “glitter factor” that drives decision making. (5) While there is no shortage of evidence to support this somewhat insulting theory, I speak with confidence, as a man who has spent more than a half his life as a solider, that this is a universal attribute of military men: if a military capability is new, proven and useful, soldiers will welcome its acquisition.
What drones will the GCC use?
GCC states can be expected to drastically increase their procurement and fielding of drones in every aspect of security — over land, at sea and for internal security. The following types of drones are most likely to be seen:
Electronic warfare (EW) drones. Arab states have not been innovators in EW. Most capabilities are purchased from states with more advanced defence industries. Drones will allow the GCC states to significantly enhance their capabilities in this neglected field. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict showed the valuable role that drones could play in compromising the enemy’s air defence radar: the Azeris simply had drones loiter in areas where air defence systems were suspected until they were “painted” by an air defence radar. Once that happened, it was relatively easy to locate the source of the emitter. The activated and located air defence system could then be targeted by conventional artillery – a “suicide” munition drone or an air-launched missile. As an expendable system, drones are ideal for baiting air defence radars into emitting and thus betraying their location. For this tactic to succeed, however, the drone must be completely integrated into a fires network which links all systems — aircraft, missiles and cannons — into an integrated command system. Those forces which decline to pursue true joint operations will find that this technique is accordingly degraded.
Loitering munitions. One of the most militarily significant uses of drones is as a loitering munition. The Azeris used the Israeli “Harop” system for this purpose to great effect. The drone is in effect a guided missile: it is flown into an area of interest and circles, waiting for a target to be identified or appear. When the target is identified, the drone flies into it and detonates an explosive warhead. (13) In addition to this explosive effect, having the drone in the air loitering has the effect of adding to the air defence monitoring burden, providing the attacker with the ability to “flood” the defensive pattern, distract the air defenders from other tasks, and degrade an air defence system by overwhelming the operator’s situational awareness.
Direct strike drones. One particularly attractive use of drones is in the direct strike mode, whereby a suicide drone is launched at a target, sort of as a low-speed high-accuracy artillery round. If the target is fixed, the drones can operate without any active guidance system, thus reducing vulnerability to electronic warfare defences. These are the sort of drones that Iran has launched at Saudi infrastructure. (14) They provide a means to project power from long distances at a fraction of the cost of manned strike aircraft or even ballistic missiles. An additional benefit is that the low flight path of these drones mask them from most strategic air defence systems looking for threats at altitude, such as ballistic missiles. The main drawback to direct strike drones is their relatively small payload. But they compensate for this with precision and with numbers: an attacker could overwhelm most air defence by flying a large number of drones together.
How will the GCC states defend against drones?
Drones have proven to be a vulnerability for all states. Partners of the United States have become accustomed to operating without consideration of air attack. Now, however, even subnational groups such as the Islamic State (IS) can field a credible air attack capability. In fact, Iraqi forces were forced to suspend operations during the recapture of Mosul because of the threat of attack from drones. While these threats are significant, their disproportionate effect primarily derives from novelty. As militaries process the lessons of drone warfare and become accustomed to dealing with drones on the battlefield, they will devise and incorporate tactics and weapons which will serve to degrade the impact of drones.
studies.aljazeera