Passing of the popular crowd Act in the last November 26 by the Iraqi Council of Representatives was deemed a great gain to the Shiite factions engaged in the popular crowd, but sharp differences that started to come out into the open between the leaders of those factions and Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi on the law itself, showing the dissatisfaction of prominent leaders of the armed factions loyal to Iran’s regime of privileges and benefits granted to the crowd, and that those leaders will not be satisfied for less than the conversion of its factions to “revolutionary guards” similar to the Iranian example .
The essence of the dispute between them is centered on the issue that leadership of the crowd is “upset” with the Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who is from its point of view , did not abide by the draft law of the popular crowd , and submitted to the Iraqi parliament entirely different draft. The crowd’s leaders see that the original draft in which the leaders of factions agreed with al-Abadi on its clauses which include the equality of the leaders and members of the popular crowd with leaders and employees of the defense and interior ministries in both the financial and armament receivables. While the Iraqi parliament approved the draft that states to adapt the legal situation of the members of the crowd according to the military hierarchy in terms of salaries, and this requires the issuance of new instructions from the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Although the draft, which the leaders of the popular crowd agreed with Haider al-Abadi does not include any reference to prevent its leaders, after the adoption of law, of political action, but the version approved by the Iraqi Council of Representatives include explicit statement that prevents every associate to the crowd from engaging in politics.
For his part, Haider Abadi, the Iraqi prime minister’s response to the objection of these leaders to inform them that it has been formed a committee to develop instructions concerning salaries and arming of the formations of popular crowd after the adoption of the law, but he also told them that the salaries and privileges of the crowd will not be, in any case, equal to the salaries and privileges of the Ministries of Defense and Interior, justifying this for the scarcity of funds, and that equality between the privileges of the crowd and security ministries will raise the angry of official military leaders.
Faced with this dispute , the leaders of Shiite objecting factions proceeded “Asaib ahl- Al-Haq, Hezbollah Brigades and the Brigades of Imam Ali, the Brigades of the al-khurasani, and Nujaba in Iraq in cooperation with the political blocs, in finding the way out of what they consider” impasse “implied by the popular crowd Act and this” impasse is ” from the perspective of those factions as stipulated in the Act concerning the assignment of the leadership of the crowd after its conversion to an independent military body within the Iraqi armed forces, to the Prime Minister, who is at the same occupy the position of commander in chief of the armed forces, and give him the power to move the troops of the crowd and choose the positions of its locations and tasks entrusted to it . This will mean the withdrawal of factions from the hands of its leaders, which can not be accepted by those influential leaders and those who stand behind of the politicians in any way, due to the fact that factions representing their striking hands and their security in their struggle to gain positions against opponents both from within the Shiite political home or outside.
Prime Minister aims to make this factions professional belonging to the commander in chief of the armed forces and not merely to follow him formally, and the elements of factions to receive instructions from him and not from the leaders of their factions , and thus they become an integral part of the Iraqi armed forces, which are under the law prohibited from the political action, and this is not accepted by the leaders of the factions of the popular crowd as they depend on them in the next elections of parliamentary and provincial councils in Iraq.
In the face of this Abu mahdi al-Muhandis chaired a meeting which put forward several options, the first of it is to amend the text of the law of popular crowd in order to achieve the demands that previously agreed upon with the Prime Minister. The second option is to engage the pro-Iranian factions in a small part of its brigades in the popular crowd, which will be formed under the new law, and to retain the bulk of its troops out of these brigades. The main objective of this option is to avoid what could be the result from the dependency of the troops of popular crowd to the General Commander of the Armed Forces in terms of loyalty, according to the rule that the fighter befriend to the one who pays his salary, and it also allows the leaders of the armed factions to own fighters and influence away from the state, and facilitates the task of participation in political work. The last option suggested is the announcement about the refusal of the factions fully to engage their fighters in the formations of the popular crowd prescribed by law.
Political analysts consider that the first and third options are improbable, and the second option is likely to be closer to the achievement , but it puts the leaders of the armed factions loyal to Iran in front of the fact that the largest influence in the authority of popular crowd , which will be formed after the adoption of the law will be for the Brigades of Salam which belong to the cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who openly declared that he would ask all his fighters to engage in formations of the crowd, because he does not fear from the absolute loyalty to him. And everyone knows that the number of the fighters of Al- Salam Brigades , alone surpasses that of all other fighters of factions combined.
There is no doubt that the Iranian regime stands strongly with the factions “displeased” with Haidar Abadi, the Iraqi prime minister, because of this law according to its current form does not serve its interests as it requires noting that it seeks to the triple reproduced : «the army, people and resistance» in Lebanon, and «the army , people and the popular crowd ” in Iraq. The Iranian regime is benefiting from his «successful» experiences and circulated it , and sees that the ability to serve its objectives in Lebanon can be moved into Iraq and to other places, and vice versa. In Lebanon, the «golden equation» was turned , that Damascus and Tehran through «Hezbollah» forced the successive governments to adopt it, as it was referring to his role in the face of Israel , into an instrument to justify all the excesses of the party and internal policy of disruption that followed whenever the political cards were slipped away from his hand, and then it turned into a way for «legislation» of its Foreign excesses and his involvement in the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars , before it become a justification for placing the hand on the institutions and take hold completely on the political decision. In practice, the triple equation was born emptied from the other partners. Regarding the «people» is only an « incubator environment » of the party, while there is no consideration for the opinion and wishes of the other components , and can be overcome and silenced by force of arms as happened in May 2008. While the powerless army does not have to give up about this role as there is the one who shares him of it , and it can not face the one who is stealing its task because it affects its role and makes it a party to a civil confrontation supposedly to be above of it .While «Hezbollah» tried in its beginning to hide its sectarian orientations putting himself to belong to the wider current «the conflict with Israel», hoping to attract some «Aerobien», then returned to abandon the reservation either through the disclosure about his involvement in the sectarian balances inside Lebanon, or through raising sectarian slogans as a title for his intervention in Syria, and the Iraqi «crowd» did not hesitate since its inception in revealing about its sectarian bright face , and the declaration of full loyalty to the Iranian regime over arming and finance by Iran and delivering its leadership to the officers of «Revolutionary Guards». If the Lebanese army initially retain a margin of independence and is subject to political authority represented by the President of the Republic and the Minister of Defense, in which factors interfere in its resolution beyond from the «Hezbollah» control , the question is about the need for the authorities in Baghdad allied with Tehran , which owns an army that it is taking hold of his decision and looks like the army which was built by Hafez al-Assad in Syria and made his senior officers are subject to those who are the lowest rank of them if they are from a certain component , to the legislation of «popular crowd» and considered it as a «military system» and the allocation of a percentage for it from the defense budget. As «Hezbollah» was turned into a military power under the Iranian decision in Lebanon and Syria, «the popular crowd» is preparing to play a similar role in Iraq in the service for the same goals.
We do not ignore the role of those who entered to crowd motivated to face «Daesh», but we must not forget the attempts to marginalize the Iraqi Army , filling the media means by the victories of those formations on the account of victories of the army . What is the role of the Iranian officer Soleimani, who has become a real leader of it, not just as an adviser as said by others ? Let’s hear what the deputy commander of «Saraya al-Khorasani», who accused the young Iraqis of the massacres of Aleppo: saying «The Haj Kassem has made men and managed to find heroes, and if the Haj Kassem was not present , those heroes would not be existed .» If the leader of the crowd thinks in this way of thinking , Do you think that he acknowledges of a status or manhood for the Iraqi army ?! Political analysts see that it was better for him to cancel the crowd, and to join those who wish to join the army according to national controls , but to join them on a sectarian basis and religious marja, this makes it away of the national principles , sought by the Iranian regime , each group returns to its religious marja or its political channel outside the boundaries.
The Iranian regime is seeking through the law of popular crowd and armed factions in Iraq to entrench the culture of “armed groups” in the Iraqi society and push to the growing of this phenomenon in the whole region, which deepens the chaos and weaken the function of states and increases the differences, and the history of the popular crowd and the circumstances of its inception and its outside association with the Iranian regime, deepen its intervention in Iraqi affairs and increases the spirit of «sectarian revenge”. This crowd, on the assumption that it was useful, at some stage against terrorism would be a burden on the Iraqi people with its large numbers and the loyalty of political doctrine may spoil the political life and turning it into a «centers of power» that are conflicting and dries the sources of the civic culture and «camped» the community and encourage other communities to create «crowds »to protect itself, and then Iraq becomes a country ruled by armed factions« gangs » which is working for the interests of its founders, regardless of the interests of the homeland. The central question: Can the Iraqi political forces to « control » the crowd in a law that would put it under the control of the state or the ruling powers want it as a power is driven by it at any time it want out of the state system ? And what about the position of the neighboring countries of what is happening in Iraq?
Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies