It seems that the post – ISIS phase will be more dangerous than ISIS stage itself , with the decline of the terrorist organization Daesh in Iraq and approaching the resolution of the battle to liberate Mosul, many problems are emerged ,some of them are Old and renewed such as determining the ownership of the disputed areas after its liberation from the control of the organization and what associated to it of component conflict , and others are new which have old dimensions and specifically with regard to a way of governance in Iraq after getting rid of the influence of the organization, in light of the return of the project of regions to the fore again and adopted by the parties who were already opposed to it in the past, and is meant here (some Sunni factions). All this takes place under international and regional wills that made from the Iraqi arena, the scene of a conflict. So the post Daesh phase is ambiguous in the long-time perspective. Everything is happening today in Iraq has related to attempts of all parties to exploit the vacuum that has occurred as a result of the consequences of the emergence Daesh and elimination of it. A vacuum that the government has not been able to get rid of its effects when looked weak in the face of the popular crowd and the Sunni political figures that have been consecrated by the system are no longer accepted as in the past at the popular level. This will be reflected on the 2018 election. Then , it will be possible to talk about a post-Daesh phase . And the political parties in Iraq show an extraordinary interest in what is called as a post-Daesh phase. Remarkably, however, that no one of those parties has provided the political vision of that stage.
Popular crowd forces are gaining its importance as they represent the military wing to fight the organization Daesh in Iraq, and despite the pivotal role it plays in the war in the country, the widely continued spread in all governorates of Iraq is surrounded by mystery. The number of fighters grouped under the banners of the popular crowd are estimated at more than sixty thousand, 35 thousand of whom make up the strength of the force of a number estimated by ninety thousand armed people. So a survival of the popular crowd constitutes, which was founded after the occupation of Mosul by Daesh, an economic and military problem for the Iraqi government noting that it took possession a percentage equal to the official military budget, as well as political functions and the link of the majority of factions to Iran in terms of funding and guidance and training. Observers of the Iraqi affair believe that the crowd became official power by law, which is an Iranian achievement and most of the factions and leaders of the crowd are loyal to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and supervised by the intelligence system of Corps of Quds and its commander Qassem Soleimani, recalling the recent visit Abadi to Tehran and warning of Khamenei to him to weaken the power of the crowd, considering the prejudice to the crowd will shake Baghdad. They stressed that the popular crowd in a post-Daesh stage is a serious threat to the civilian peace and security and will have repercussions on the political scene and the upcoming elections, expressing their belief that the government’s decision to end the crowd is not easy and must be programmed to follow the steps to end this subject.
Recent studies suggest that the popular crowd in Iraq would be the next goal of the US administration, after the elimination of the organization Daesh; which be clarified through statements in earlier times by the US president, Donald Trump, who launched repeatedly verbal campaigns on Iran, stressing that the popular crowd will be the most prominent challenges after the salvation from the organization Daesh in Iraq. Studies showed that the Iraqi government should decide whether to allow the mission of the remaining US military support to remain in Iraq, as part of his talk about entering of the war against al Daesh to its final stage. These studies are of the view that the US administration has two plans in the region on Iraq, the first “requires that Abadi should bridle the influence of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards on the popular crowd.” And that “Abadi is required since the meeting with Trump in last March to implement this scenario which is the best, but it is the worst scenario in the event of Abadi has not implemented this agreement, and then the impact of the Revolutionary Guards becomes stronger than Abadi himself. Here Iraq will be a potential arena for confrontation with the growing American influence in the region. “In that case, the United States will use the second plan”, which is the confrontation with popular crowd through the Sunni allies or allies of the people of the regions, as it faced al-Qaeda “, referring to the Awakening, which supported by America to fight al-Qaida in 2006.
As for the next electoral scene in Iraq, the political parties seeking to verify the size of its representation at that stage where the division of roles is still uncertain, because of the struggle for positions of influence between the component parties of the same party. The ruling National Alliance, a coalition of Shiite parties divided in the face of the position to be taken on the issue of Sunni participation in governance, size and type of Sunni personalities that are still the subject of confidence for Iran first and second coalition. The Sunni camp known of his fragile position on the political process as a whole, there are attempts being made to reproduce sectarian symbols that have been excluded or hidden under the pretext of acceptance enjoyed by those symbols at the Arab level, which helps to attract investment in the devastated areas. As it seems, these attempts are still collide with the ban imposed by the hawks in the Shiite camp on the Arab openness.
If the risk of Daesh began to end from the Diary of ordinary Iraqi man but the devastation caused to Mosul, a major Sunni cities, will leave disappointing and melancholic impact on the scene. So that no one of the advocates of Sunni participation in the government dare to disclose the size of the human and material losses that resulted from the operations of seizure of Daesh in Mosul and liberation of it . Hadba city has paid the price twice. Once when it was delivered to Daesh in the context of the orchestrated plan and again when restored from the terrorist organization. On the other hand, the hope of Kurdish leaders and all advocates of the secession of the Kurdish region from Iraq was big, that regional powers will allow, particularly Turkey and Iran to redraw the borders of their territory by biting more land named the disputed areas by taking advantage of the Peshmerga liberation of those lands from the grip of Daesh. The promised referendum is an attempt to test the waters. However, the reactions were not encouraging so the enthusiasm of those leaders fizzled out and their voices are no more heard in the waiting what can be resulted in Shiite-Shiite conflict on the one hand and on the other hand, the Sunni-Sunni conflict. It is important that the restoration of Iraq and Syria from «Daesh» opened its doors to the forces that have contributed to the process of liberalization, such as Iran and the United States.
Battle of Mosul against Daesh is almost going to an end by the defeat Daesh but aftershocks and consequences of seism occurred in Iraq may lead to a more dangerous situation in this country, which suffers political , social and sectarian differences . Observers of the Iraqi affair warned of the possibility of dividing Iraq under the banners of marginalization of grievances raised by Iraqi components, and calls for self-determination advocated by the Kurds and accusations of corruption and hegemony and creating chaos. However, with the approach of the end of the battle of Mosul, Iraqi parties began to talk about the idea of new regions and provinces may be the actual entrance to the end of the unity of Iraq, especially if the proposed administrative division took a character of sectarianism or nationality. All of this comes under the expansion of militias backed by regional states may wish to keep the situation in Iraq fragile or split in the service of its strategic interests.
Perhaps self-determination, which the government of Kurdistan Region of Iraq intends to organize a referendum on it may be the entrance to divide Iraq with reservations made by the Iraqi government on it, but if this referendum is carried out, it will encourage other Iraqi factions to claim the same fate. So, will the battle of Mosul be the beginning of the end of Daesh in the region and also a beginning for large –scale political engagements that could hit the minimum of unity of Iraq? Is it possible for Iraqis to overcome the post-Mosul phase peacefully? Questions remain outstanding and subject to the ability of Iraqi politicians to avoid obstacles that may be the most difficult stage in the history of modern Iraq. The complexity of the current Iraqi scene, in particular through the American-Iranian conflict and also through what was posed by the Kurdistan referendum of challenges and the lack of a genuine internal reconciliation, makes the anxiety surrounding the post Daesh phase in Iraq.
The Iraqi Studies Unit
Rawbet Center for Research and Strategic Studies