Popular Crowd Forces in Iraq ( Al-Hashd al-shaabi ) .. Origin and Future “survey”

Popular Crowd Forces in Iraq ( Al-Hashd al-shaabi ) .. Origin and Future “survey”

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Popular Crowd  Forces in Iraq, military factions, were formed in June 13, 2014 based on a fatwa of  Shiite cleric Ali al-Sistani to confront the organization Daesh, where the crowd is to become a legal cover to these factions, which have increased in number over time. The  popular crowd has become  as a result of victories against  Daesh a significant number in the present and future of Iraq. As the popular crowd  was turned into regular forces sponsored  and trained by the Iraqi government , and in June 2015, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said that the popular crowd is  part of the Iraqi security system, and it receives funding from the Iraqi government . In  last July  ,  the Iraqi prime minister, Haidar al-Abbadi, ordered  the restructuring of the popular crowd and turning it into a military formation comparable to the anti-terrorism  system. Because of this steady military importance acquired by the popular crowd since its  inception  and  establishment of  its presence in the Iraqi reality, the Rawabet  Centre for Research and Strategic Studies conducted a survey to identify the military factions that make up the popular crowd, and are as follows

Factions of the popular crowd

T The name Leader Working Yard Religious Marja (authority)
1 Saraya Al-salam  / Sadrist Kazem Hussein Al-Issawi Iraq /  Samarra sector- Qayyarah Iraq:  Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei.
2 Badr-Corps-military wing the Badr Organization Hadi al-Ameri Iraq- Salahuddin sector, Diyala, Syria Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
3 Kata’ib  Iraqi  Hezbollah – Jaafar al-Ghanemi Iraq-Sector of Anbar,   Salah al-Din / Nukhayib Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
4 Asa’ib Ahl- Haq Qais al-Khazali Iraq-Sector of Salah al-Din / Nukhayib, Syria Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
5  Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada Hashim Banyan ul-Awliya:              Abu Alaa “ Iraq-Sector Baghdad belt, Salah al-Din Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
6 Kata’ib Hezbollah Al- Nujaba Akram Abbas,  al-Kaabi Iraq-Sector of Baghdad belt, Syria Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
7 Kata’b Imam Ali Shibil  Zaidi Iraq-Sector of Baghdad belt, Syria Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
8 Kata’b Jund al-Imam Ahmed al-Asadi “Abu Jaafar al-Asadi” Iraq-Sectorof Anbar and Salahuddin. Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
9 Saraya al-Khorasani Ali al-Yassiri Iraq- sector of belt and center of Baghdad Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
10 Liwa Abu Fadhal  Al-Abbas Aws al-Khafaji Iraq-belt of Baghdad, Syria Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
11 Saraya Aljhad- Supreme Islamic Council Hassan Radhi al-sarees Iraq-Anbar Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
12 Ansar   al-Aqeeda Islamic  Higher Council Jalal al-Din Ali al-Saghir Iraq-Anbar Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
13 Saraya Ansar al-Ashura – the Islamic Supreme Council Kadhim al-Jabri, “Abu Ahmed al-Jabri” Iraq-Nukhayib Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
14 Kata’b  al-Tayyar of Al-Risali Adnan Ormad al-shahmani Iraq and Syria Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
15 Al-Abbas Fighting Division Maitham al-Zaidi Iraq-Nukhayib Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
16 Kata’ib  alshaheed al-Awal- Dawa Party-Iraq Organization – Hashim al-Musawi Wathiq al- Fartusi Iraq-Alnikhyeebis Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
17 Kata’bal-shaheed al- Sadr Awal –Dawa party-Iraq Organization  Hashim al-Musawi Gen. Abid al-Karim  Al-Gazan Iraq-Samarra Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
18 Kata’b of  elite and Ghaith Alhaidara- Dawa Party Home Organization  Abdelkarim Anzi Manaf al-Husseini Iraq-Anbar Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
19 Liwa Ali al- Akbar  Islamic Action Organization Ali al-Hamdani Iraq-Nukhayib Iran: Ayatollah Sadeq Shirazi
20 Liwa al-Shabab al-Risali Maitham Al-allaq Iraq-Karbala Iraq: Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Yacoubi
21 Kata’b   Ansar al-Marja’yya Hamid al-Yassiri Iraq-Samarra Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
22 Liwa Assad Allah  al-Ghalib Suhail al-Araji Syria Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
23 Jaysh al-Mukhtar Wathiq Al- Battat Iraq-Syria Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
24 Faylaq al-Wa’ad al-Sadiq Ammar al-Haddad Iraq and Syria Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
25 Kata’ib  Ansar al-Hijja Mohammad Kanani Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
26 Kata’ib  Qamar  Bani Hashim Abu Talib Mayahi Iraq Anbar  Iraq: Ayatollah Kamal al-Haidari
27 Hezbollah  Tha’irun Rehman Al-jazaeri Iraq Baghdad belt Lebanon: Hassan Nasrallah, Mohammed Alcauthrana
28 Kata’b  Imad Mughniyeh, Iraqi Hezbollah-Kata’bs Saad al-Fatlawi, “Abu Khaled” Iraq Anbar Lebanon: Nasrallah
29 Brigade of Qasim  Al-jabareen Mohammed al-Musawi Iraq-Nukhayib Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
30 Liwa al-Imam al-Qa’im Talib  Alaleaoa Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
31 Kata’ib   A’imat al-Baqi Jihad al-Tamimi Iraq Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
32  Ansar Allah al-Awfiya Haider Ghraoui Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
33 Liwa al-Munta’ar Dagher al-Moussawi Iraq Baghdad belt Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
34 Kata’ib thar ullah Walid al-Hilli Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
35 Kata’ib  al-Qasas Abdullah al-Lami Iraq-Samarra Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
36 Kata’b Ashbal Al- Sadr Mohammed Hussein al-Sadr Iraq-Samarra Iran: Kazem al-Haeri
37 Kata’ib  Thaer al-Hussein Ghassan Shahbandar Iraq-Nukhayib Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
38 Kata’ib Malik Ashtar Jafar Abbas al-Musawi Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
39 Kata’ib Al-Dem Al-Zakeya Mu’ayyad Ali Hakim Iraq-Baghdad belt Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
40 Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar Hussein al-Tamimi Iraq-Baghdad belt Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
41 Harakat al-Abdal Jaafar al-Moussawi Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
42 Kata’ib Muslim bin Aqeel Ahmed Fartusi Iraq-Baghdad belt Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
43  Liwa al-Imam al-Mahdi Naji Hilfi Iraq-Baghdad belt Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
44 Liwa  al-Mu’ammal Saad  Swar Iraq Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
45 Kata’ib al-Adalah(justice) Samir Sheikh Ali Iraq-Baghdad belt Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
46 KatA’ib  Al-Fatih (Conquest Brigades) Kazim Ali Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
47 KatA’ib  Saraya al-Zahra Mumtaz Al-Haidari Iraq-Baghdad belt Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
48    Islamic Army in Iraq Jamal Al-Wakeel Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Sadeq Shirazi
49 Kata’ib  Al-Ataba Al-Husayniya Abd Mahdi Karbalai Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
50 Kata’ib al-Aqila Zainab Hassan Alshakrgi Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
51 Liwa al-Al- Tuff Mustafa al-Musawi Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
52 Kata’ib   Al-Imam al-Galib Mohammed al-Lami Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
53 Kata’ib   Al- Imam Al-Hussein Hassan al-Rubaie Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
54 Kata’ib   Al- Husseini Al-qiam Mohammad Khafaji Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
55 Kata’ib Dir’ al-wilaya Alaa sleazy Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
56 Kataib   Al-Qariah Ahmed Zamili Iraq-Baghdad belt Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
57 Kata’ib  Yed Allah (Hand of God ) Ahmed al-Saadi Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
58 Kata’ib Bqiyat Allah ( Mustafa al-Obeidi Iraq-Baghdad belt * Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
59 Kata’ib  al-Shabab al-Islami Mostafavi Musawi Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
60 Kata’ib    Ahl Al-Bayt Musa al-Hassani Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
61 Saraya PDF Mezher al-Khafaji Iraq-Baghdad belt Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
62     Kataib  alttifl Al-radie Wissam al-Haidari Iraq-Baghdad belt Iraq: Ayatollah Kamal al-Haidari
63 Kata’ib  Mukhtar  Althagafi Mahdi Karbalai Iraq-Baghdad belt Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
64 Saraya   Al-Sajad Mahdi Karbalai Iraq-Baghdad belt Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
65 Kata’ib   waad ullah Sami al-Masoudi, deputy of the head of the Shiite Waqf Iraq-Baghdad belt Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
66 Kata’ib  al-Ghawth al-Adham Firas  Al-Allaq Iraq-Baghdad belt Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani
67   Kata’ib  of Babylon Ryan Chaldean Iraq-Baghdad belt Christian movement

It is clear from this table that each faction of the factions of the popular crowd has its organizational structure and its leader, and  work yard, and religious  marja.  the Square of military activity in most of them is    Iraq and some of them are also active militarily in Syria in support of President Bashar al-Assad, and  also  the religious  marja for most of them is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. There is also a Christian faction which represents that  the popular crowd is  transient to the religious situation in Iraq, and that the face of the organization Daesh is not limited to a specific  religion in  Iraq.

People crowd is managed by the Shura Council , called “Shura Council of the Islamic Resistance,” and the  council  comprises of some of the important leaders of the factions affiliated under the name of “popular crowd” and be headed by “Abu Mahdi Mohandes, and Hadi al-Amiri,” and the membership of:

1-Hashim Banyan  al-walai, “Abu Alaa,” Secretary General of the kataib  Sayyid al-Shuhada.

2-Hadi Qais al-Khazali, Secretary General of the Asaib ahl-al-Haq ( League of the Righteous).

3- Akram Abbas al-Kaabi, Secretary General of  the movement of Hezbollah nujaba .

4-Ahmad al-Asadi “Abu Jaafar al-Assadi,” Secretary General of the Movement of Jund of the Imam.

5-Hassan al-Sari  , commander Saraya al- Jihad  of the Islamic Supreme Council.

6-Hajji  shibl al- Zaidi, Secretary General of the kataib  of Imam Ali.

7-Hassan  munis  al- abodi ,  kataib of  Iraqi Hezbollah .

8-Ali Yasiri, commander of Saraya al-Khorasani.

  1. Adnan Ormad al-shahmani , commander of Saraya of Tayyar al-Risali  .

10- Mueen al-Kazimi ,   member of the Shura Council, the Badr Organization.

The aim of forming this council  is to issue decisions that belong to the popular crowd in terms of training or arming that  is to consider  the Council is primarily responsible for all matters relating to it without  consulting to the Prime Minister or the official responsible of the crowd Faleh al-Fayad.

there are spokespersons  in its name for this crowd , the following are their  names:

1-Joseph  al-kalabi , spokesman for the security of the popular crowd.

2-Karim Douhi  al-Nuri , official spokesman of the popular crowd – in charge of media office of the Organization of Al-Bader .

3-Ahmed Al-Asadi “Abu Jaafar al-Assadi,” the official spokesman for the crowd ,  Secretary general of the movement of   Jund al-Imam.

4-Hassan Ismail al-Moussawi, in charge of  the  public relations  for the popular crowd.

Because the battle of the popular crowd against al Daesh   not just a military battle, but a large part of which  is  media also so all channels of the blocks and the Shiite parties linked to Iran became  at the disposal of the body of  war information  of  the popular crowd  in order to broadcast all military operations in all  sectors and  all these satellite channels are under the command   of pasim al-Saadi , the Director General of the Information  office of the kataib of  Iraqi Hezbollah  .

the existence of the leadership  for the crowd  did not prevent from being  individual  remarks and actions  from each faction affiliated   under the banner of the popular crowd and the goal is for the purpose of showing the strength of this faction in the Iraqi arena  for  the service of  personal and individual interests for this faction where you see in all parts of the Iraqi capital Baghdad, pictures of the dead  of each faction with pictures of its leader.

In spite of the popular crowd  consists of sixty-seven armed factions, however, 80% percent of the military effort is the responsibility of Saraya   al-Salam, the Badr  brigades , the Hezbollah kataib of Iraq, and Asaib ahl-al-Haq ( the League of the Righteous). The following is a summary   a bout those factions that form the cornerstone of the popular crowd.

 Saraya Al-Salam

The new name chosen by  the Mahdi Army for itself, the armed wing of the Sadrist current led by Muqtada al-Sadr. Mahdi Army was formed  in July 2003 after the assassination of the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution  Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim. His name was derived from the awaited Mahdi , Twelfth Imam of  Shiites . Mahdi Army composed  of volunteer members  is divided into military units starting from small groups within the faction, composed of fifty fighters, followed by the  company of three hundred fighters, and  each seven Saraya constitute the regiment. Estimates of the number of elements have amounted to about ten   thousand . Mahdi Army  engaged in battles against the Americans, including  two battles  in Najaf and Basra  in which  it soon    was  defeated  to reach an agreement with the Americans to hand over  its  weapon to the   joint US-  IraqiCommission  in 2004.  Iran was discontent    with  Saraya Alsalam  since it was not   controlled    by it .    So  Qassem Soleimani commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard  seeks  to bring about a split in the inside  of it through large fiscal temptation  to those affiliated  under the Saraya Al-Salam.

Badr Corps

It is a faction that it  began its activity as the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which was founded by Mohammed Baqir al – Hakim in Iran in 1982 and under the supervision of Tehran during the war with Iraq, and has participated in the war alongside the Iranian  troops  Badr Corps was  entitled (before it was changed  to the organization) to  follow – up investigations  with prisoners of the Iraqi army with Iran, and was charged with murder and torture in detention camps. Estimates indicate  that the number of its members before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was somewhere between 10 and 15 thousand, and soon that number rose to levels that are tens of thousands (some statistics speak for about one hundred thousand) .  later on , it was transformed to  the “Badr Organization” headed by the former Minister of transport Hadi al – Amiri. Faction of  the  Badr was accused  to liquidate cadres of the Iraqi elites of scientists, doctors, soldiers and Iraqi Baathists  in revenge for the years of conflict with Iran. In 2006   , it was   attributed to  it  crimes against the Sunnis who were killed and arrested and displaced , especially in the province of Diyala.  The Badr Organization  has a history of conflict with the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army as a war for influence in Iraq ,  and it is one of the largest supporters of the regime of Bashar al – Assad.

Iraqi Hezbullah  Kataib

It is one of the most important and most dangerous Iranian-backed Shiite factions, which  the Iranian “Quds Force”  undertakes its funding and training, there  is no known leadership, however,  they are organizational structures represented  by the Consultative Council and political council,  Jamal Jaafar Ibrahim, or Abu Mahdi Mohandes is seen  as responsible for the establishment of this group, which is the strongest military representative of Iran in Iraq, and  according to information that Imad Mughniyah, one of the most prominent of the leaders of “Hezbollah,” the Lebanese, shares  in the establishment of this armed group.

And  the Iranian care of the kataib reveals its commitment of loyalty to the rule of “religious leader” in Iran (Velaval- efaqih), and is working to expand the boundaries of the “Islamic revolution”, they are directly linked to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and the military representative in Iraq, Qassem Soleimani, commander of the “Qods Force”, as well as the use of vocabulary espoused by the Iranian regime in the vision of the West, for example, but not limited ,  the kataib announced in a statement issued on 04.08.2014 “the people of Iraq today has  not a self  force by which it could  to defend itself ,”  to remind  by saying, “the experience of resisting the arrogant powers are still    on the ground present  in   his hands to provide it with strength and fortitude. ” Also it has ties to the Lebanese Hezbollah, since its members are trained in Lebanon of  courses on planting improvised explosive devices, and training to coordinate the attacks of small and medium weapons, and sniper attacks and mortar fire, and rocket attacks.

the “Hezbollah Kataib”  donot follow certain parties from Shiite parties, and therefore classified themselves as “Islamic resistance” derived  the nature of their work and mechanisms of this kind, that the first military operations carried out by the militia against US forces in Iraq, was on October 23  2003 and under the name  Kataib  “Abu al Fadl Abbas’ , to merge then with other armed groups funded by Iran, such as:” Kataib of Karbala “, the” Kataib of Zaid bin Ali,  Kataib of Ali Akber and kataib Al-Sajad  “,  noting that each one had been working  independently   from each  other and without learning something about the other kataib,  until it was  announced about its   integration and fight under the  one name which  is the “Kataib of Hezbollah” during a statement published by the Kataib  in the August 21  2007.

Kataib managed  in 2010 to develop Katyusha rockets and production of new missiles  which  are “Zulfikar ,  Karar and  Haider,” and used against US bases, in the January 5, 2011, it differs in its armament   from  the rest of the other factions, being to  manufacture weapons by  themselves, as well as arsenal of weapons that  gained  from  stores of the Iraqi army after the US occupation of the country in 2003. This means possession of  logistical , technical and scientific  capabilities  that  enable them to manufacture some weapons of various kinds .

The arsenal  owned by the kataib  includes  a variety of weapons  including: Kalashnikov “AK-47”, pistols and the “M16” and the “PKC” and rocket projectiles RPG-7 and snipers B29, HS-50 and mortar from 60 to 180 mm  and Katyusha rockets and “Strala” to resist-aircraft  and  unilateral, bilateral  and quartet guns , and  small launchers mounted on the ground and moving on wheels.

Fighters of  Kataib  had  experience in using various improvised explosive devices, which were used heavily against US forces, as well as the engineers and technicians of kataib   managed to  manufacture new weapons, such as Ashtar missiles, which they developed it later on ,  and  they made missiles of  Zulfikar and Karar, which are  more powerful in the destruction , explosion  and speed, and control  of   the propulsion  to  distances  whether they are close or far away.

Asaib Ahl-Al –Haq (League of the Righteous )

Asaib of Ahl-Ahl-Haq ( League of the Righteous ) Movement, or so-called  by its supporters, “the Islamic Resistance in Iraq”  came out from the womb of the Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr, and was founded by  Qais al-Khazali  by the former leader of the Sadrist  current .  he was split from the Sadr’s Mehdi Army in 2004 after a year of American occupation of Iraq to  establish  a movement private to him . When the fighting  was stopped after the  ceasefire agreement  of Mahdi Army signed with the Iraqi government and the US army , Khazali has continued to give orders to continue to fight without  consultation   to Sadr.

But things returned to normal state between the leadership of this movement and Muqtada al-Sadr in the reconciliation took place a mid-2005, but after less than a year, ” Asaib Ahl-Al-Haq – League of the Righteous,” emerged as  agroup working   independently fully from    the Mahdi Army after  the announcement of Sadr to  dissolve  and replace it  with ” kataib of  al-Youm-al-Mawud (   promised day”)  and demanded ” Asaib ahl-al-Haq to join to him  but  it  refused. Asaib ahl-al-HaqThe receive training and arms  from the Qods Force  that belongs to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Alasaib announced that it has implemented six thousand operation targeting the US military and Iraqi forces, including  operations of the kidnapping of foreigners , but the most prominent attack of  them was in the December 20 / January 2007 in the city of Karbala when they stormed an Iraqi police station that there was inside it  a US joint security unit  and killed a US soldier and abducted four others who have  killed them later. After the attack, the US army  launched a campaign on the group and killed the mastermind of the  Karbala attack  Azhar al-Dulaimi in Baghdad, and the arrest of many of the group’s leaders, including Qais al-Khazali.  Asaib ahl-al-Haq  has responded to the arrest of kidnapping  five Britons  from one of the premises of the Ministry of Finance in central Baghdad. The captives are Peter Moore, an expert from the company “BearingPoint” for  management working for the US government, and four security guards of the company, “Garda World” Canadian security who were with him. As the guards died during the kidnapping. In January the Iraqi government released of  Qais al-Khazali in exchange for the release of Asaib ahl- al-Haq  of the British hostage, “Peter Moore.”

Qais al-Khazali ,  the Secretary General of Asaib ahl-al-Haq  is to be considered  among the most opposed ones  to the division of Iraq and its unity. And  his organization  has  a large political finance ,  it  has one representative in the Iraqi parliament, who is  Hassan Salem, as the Asaib ahl-al-Haq League  has  a satellite channel speaking in their name, it is the Al-Ahd   channel .

After the outbreak  of the Syrian revolution in March  2011,  Asaib ahl-Haq surpassed  its  country’s geography  to send its members to fight in Syria under the pretext of “defending the shrine of Sayeda Zeinab,” and its  elements affiliated  under the banner of “Abou El Fadl Abbas” rampant in Rif  of  Damascus, specifically in the areas  surrounding the   shrine .

In addition to these  armed factions there is an Iraqi organization   which is no less importance than them, it is  an Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council, noting that  the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq  was established in 1982 in Iran, and then transferred in 2003 to Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council. The council aims to be a framework that includes all Shiite factions operating in the political field and  formerly led by  Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Baqer al-Hakim and mostly in the Supreme Council Members  are Iraqis fled to Iran during the first Gulf War. Personality of  Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim represents a pivotal role in determining the positions of the Council and political activity  and  within the components of Islamic Supreme Council  is a military wing known as the Badr Corps, which dissented from the council  later on. After the killing of Mr. Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim ,  the  presidency of the council   was moved  to his brother  , Mr. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, and after the latter’s death in 2009 his son, Ammar  al-Hakim was elected president but  central  Shura  remains   representing the leading  body and decision-center. Ammar al-Hakim is the grandson of the religious Marja( authority), Grand Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim, the Shiite Marja  in Iraq  dead in  1970. The leaders of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq are known by the Iraqi society, and   this  council  is characterized in control of its members, since it has not been charged with any errors or crimes  committed by it

In addition to this survey  of  the  popular crowd  in Iraq , the rawabet center  l for Research and Strategic Studies   conducted  in various Iraqi provinces  an opinion poll concerning elections, on  provincial council elections, and  the House of Representatives, which will hold in the years 2017, and 2018 m respectively, and  this poll show   a fierce competition  will be intensified between Saraya al-Salam and the  Badr Corps  and  kataib of Iraqi Hezbollah and the Asaib ahl- al-HaqLeague  on the  seats of  these councils since it is anticipated that these factions will get half of  the seats in parliament and provincial councils.

The question in this context, what is the future of the popular crowd in Iraq after Daesh? Would it   be merged in state institutions or  to  develop   a body  of  its  own? The continuation of the popular crowd in Iraq after Daesh may increase the Iraq’s internal and external crises , Internally , we can talk here that the continuance  of it would increase the burden on Iraq’s Finance especially  the Iraqi state  since years ago  is suffering from a severe financial crisis due to the decline in global oil prices which reflected directly on the government sector because the Iraqi government has become unable to pay salaries to half of its staff, and is no doubt the government will double the deficit with the addition of more than 100 thousand element of the popular crowd at Iraq’s institutions. The  Matter here is not confined only to the salaries of those elements, but also the need of the military supplies and financial allocations for media channels as well. This financial crisis has been accompanied by a security crisis in Iraq, noting  the factions  that make up the popular crowd and that has been integrated into the Iraqi state institutions, but it effectively will continue to receive orders from its  organizational leadership and not government Each knows that those particular factions “Saraya al-Salam,  Kataib of Iraqi Hezbollah   and the Asaib ahl-al-Haq , the Badr Corps  “in control of certain  parts of the Iraqi capital Baghdad and the provinces of Shiite component , and these factions have the ammunition and weapons making their control   seems actual  division  of  the areas that they control as if we were in front of the case ” the kings of   communities  that prevailed in the state of Andalusia as conflicts and wars between them led to the fall of Andalusia and this may be repeated in Iraq after Daesh and postmodern world as faction leaders in Iraq  will become  emirs of  communities, including  disagreements and conflicts among them  may lead  Iraq to the brink of the abyss,  and what  demonstrates the validity of this hypothesis as the armed factions already  fought  in  armed conflicts  among themselves in the south of Iraq.

On the external level that the continuation of the popular crowd in Iraq after Daesh and its political, military, security and media and economic weight and a link of  the main factions as it is well  known  to  the Iranian regime and control of this regime on  Iraq since 2006 and to this day, it may make  of the  popular crowd as  a reserve army to the  Iranian regime  in Iraq and be a tool for this system  to intervene in Arab affairs to destabilize it, so  it is no wonder that   some factions of the popular crowd will be sent  after getting rid of  the Daesh in Iraq to Syria to support Bashar al-Assad, and send it also to some of the Arab Gulf states, here  is  the disaster that have been taken place in  Iraq first and Secondly in  Arab region  taking into the consideration  that the  Iranian regime in this case hits the Arabs with Arabs,    taking advantage from  this beating. This is not what we  hope for.

No one can deny the positive role of the popular crowd in fighting the terrorist organization Daesh  and its  serious  contribution  with Iraqi forces and the international coalition in the “liberation” of Iraq from  it , and this role was respected by all  and raise the hat to it , including  the rawabet  Centre for Research and Strategic Studies, but once to  turn the page of  the terrorist Daesh  in Iraq ,  it  assumes   to turn  the page on the popular crowd also    that requires from the  religious Marja ( authority) once the liberation of Iraq from terrorist  al Daesh  to issue a religious Fatwa  to  stop “Jihad Ulkipaia” so as not to let  the popular crowd   to continue working  based on the opinion previously issued by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,  so to stop the  fatwa means  to lift  sacredness  about the factions of the popular crowd and return to their  natural  lives   before the emergence of al Daesh in Iraq, to ​​maintain a unified Iraq.




Rawabet Center for  Research and Strategic Studies