Popular Crowd Forces in Iraq, military factions, were formed in June 13, 2014 based on a fatwa of Shiite cleric Ali al-Sistani to confront the organization Daesh, where the crowd is to become a legal cover to these factions, which have increased in number over time. The popular crowd has become as a result of victories against Daesh a significant number in the present and future of Iraq. As the popular crowd was turned into regular forces sponsored and trained by the Iraqi government , and in June 2015, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said that the popular crowd is part of the Iraqi security system, and it receives funding from the Iraqi government . In last July , the Iraqi prime minister, Haidar al-Abbadi, ordered the restructuring of the popular crowd and turning it into a military formation comparable to the anti-terrorism system. Because of this steady military importance acquired by the popular crowd since its inception and establishment of its presence in the Iraqi reality, the Rawabet Centre for Research and Strategic Studies conducted a survey to identify the military factions that make up the popular crowd, and are as follows
Factions of the popular crowd
|T||The name||Leader||Working Yard||Religious Marja (authority)|
|1||Saraya Al-salam / Sadrist||Kazem Hussein Al-Issawi||Iraq / Samarra sector- Qayyarah||Iraq: Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei.|
|2||Badr-Corps-military wing the Badr Organization||Hadi al-Ameri||Iraq- Salahuddin sector, Diyala, Syria||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|3||Kata’ib Iraqi Hezbollah –||Jaafar al-Ghanemi||Iraq-Sector of Anbar, Salah al-Din / Nukhayib||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|4||Asa’ib Ahl- Haq||Qais al-Khazali||Iraq-Sector of Salah al-Din / Nukhayib, Syria||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|5||Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada||Hashim Banyan ul-Awliya: Abu Alaa “||Iraq-Sector Baghdad belt, Salah al-Din||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|6||Kata’ib Hezbollah Al- Nujaba||Akram Abbas, al-Kaabi||Iraq-Sector of Baghdad belt, Syria||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|7||Kata’b Imam Ali||Shibil Zaidi||Iraq-Sector of Baghdad belt, Syria||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|8||Kata’b Jund al-Imam||Ahmed al-Asadi “Abu Jaafar al-Asadi”||Iraq-Sectorof Anbar and Salahuddin.||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|9||Saraya al-Khorasani||Ali al-Yassiri||Iraq- sector of belt and center of Baghdad||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|10||Liwa Abu Fadhal Al-Abbas||Aws al-Khafaji||Iraq-belt of Baghdad, Syria||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|11||Saraya Aljhad- Supreme Islamic Council||Hassan Radhi al-sarees||Iraq-Anbar||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|12||Ansar al-Aqeeda Islamic Higher Council||Jalal al-Din Ali al-Saghir||Iraq-Anbar||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|13||Saraya Ansar al-Ashura – the Islamic Supreme Council||Kadhim al-Jabri, “Abu Ahmed al-Jabri”||Iraq-Nukhayib||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|14||Kata’b al-Tayyar of Al-Risali||Adnan Ormad al-shahmani||Iraq and Syria||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|15||Al-Abbas Fighting Division||Maitham al-Zaidi||Iraq-Nukhayib||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|16||Kata’ib alshaheed al-Awal- Dawa Party-Iraq Organization – Hashim al-Musawi||Wathiq al- Fartusi||Iraq-Alnikhyeebis||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|17||Kata’bal-shaheed al- Sadr Awal –Dawa party-Iraq Organization Hashim al-Musawi||Gen. Abid al-Karim Al-Gazan||Iraq-Samarra||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|18||Kata’b of elite and Ghaith Alhaidara- Dawa Party Home Organization Abdelkarim Anzi||Manaf al-Husseini||Iraq-Anbar||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|19||Liwa Ali al- Akbar Islamic Action Organization||Ali al-Hamdani||Iraq-Nukhayib||Iran: Ayatollah Sadeq Shirazi|
|20||Liwa al-Shabab al-Risali||Maitham Al-allaq||Iraq-Karbala||Iraq: Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Yacoubi|
|21||Kata’b Ansar al-Marja’yya||Hamid al-Yassiri||Iraq-Samarra||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|22||Liwa Assad Allah al-Ghalib||Suhail al-Araji||Syria||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|23||Jaysh al-Mukhtar||Wathiq Al- Battat||Iraq-Syria||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|24||Faylaq al-Wa’ad al-Sadiq||Ammar al-Haddad||Iraq and Syria||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|25||Kata’ib Ansar al-Hijja||Mohammad Kanani||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|26||Kata’ib Qamar Bani Hashim||Abu Talib Mayahi||Iraq Anbar||Iraq: Ayatollah Kamal al-Haidari|
|27||Hezbollah Tha’irun||Rehman Al-jazaeri||Iraq Baghdad belt||Lebanon: Hassan Nasrallah, Mohammed Alcauthrana|
|28||Kata’b Imad Mughniyeh, Iraqi Hezbollah-Kata’bs||Saad al-Fatlawi, “Abu Khaled”||Iraq Anbar||Lebanon: Nasrallah|
|29||Brigade of Qasim Al-jabareen||Mohammed al-Musawi||Iraq-Nukhayib||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|30||Liwa al-Imam al-Qa’im||Talib Alaleaoa||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|31||Kata’ib A’imat al-Baqi||Jihad al-Tamimi||Iraq||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|32||Ansar Allah al-Awfiya||Haider Ghraoui||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|33||Liwa al-Munta’ar||Dagher al-Moussawi||Iraq Baghdad belt||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|34||Kata’ib thar ullah||Walid al-Hilli||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|35||Kata’ib al-Qasas||Abdullah al-Lami||Iraq-Samarra||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|36||Kata’b Ashbal Al- Sadr||Mohammed Hussein al-Sadr||Iraq-Samarra||Iran: Kazem al-Haeri|
|37||Kata’ib Thaer al-Hussein||Ghassan Shahbandar||Iraq-Nukhayib||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|38||Kata’ib Malik Ashtar||Jafar Abbas al-Musawi||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|39||Kata’ib Al-Dem Al-Zakeya||Mu’ayyad Ali Hakim||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|40||Liwa Dhu al-Fiqar||Hussein al-Tamimi||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|41||Harakat al-Abdal||Jaafar al-Moussawi||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|42||Kata’ib Muslim bin Aqeel||Ahmed Fartusi||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|43||Liwa al-Imam al-Mahdi||Naji Hilfi||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|44||Liwa al-Mu’ammal||Saad Swar||Iraq||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|45||Kata’ib al-Adalah(justice)||Samir Sheikh Ali||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|46||KatA’ib Al-Fatih (Conquest Brigades)||Kazim Ali||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|47||KatA’ib Saraya al-Zahra||Mumtaz Al-Haidari||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|48||Islamic Army in Iraq||Jamal Al-Wakeel||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Sadeq Shirazi|
|49||Kata’ib Al-Ataba Al-Husayniya||Abd Mahdi Karbalai||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|50||Kata’ib al-Aqila Zainab||Hassan Alshakrgi||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|51||Liwa al-Al- Tuff||Mustafa al-Musawi||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|52||Kata’ib Al-Imam al-Galib||Mohammed al-Lami||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|53||Kata’ib Al- Imam Al-Hussein||Hassan al-Rubaie||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|54||Kata’ib Al- Husseini Al-qiam||Mohammad Khafaji||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|55||Kata’ib Dir’ al-wilaya||Alaa sleazy||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|56||Kataib Al-Qariah||Ahmed Zamili||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|57||Kata’ib Yed Allah (Hand of God )||Ahmed al-Saadi||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|58||Kata’ib Bqiyat Allah (||Mustafa al-Obeidi||Iraq-Baghdad belt *||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|59||Kata’ib al-Shabab al-Islami||Mostafavi Musawi||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|60||Kata’ib Ahl Al-Bayt||Musa al-Hassani||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|61||Saraya PDF||Mezher al-Khafaji||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei|
|62||Kataib alttifl Al-radie||Wissam al-Haidari||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iraq: Ayatollah Kamal al-Haidari|
|63||Kata’ib Mukhtar Althagafi||Mahdi Karbalai||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|64||Saraya Al-Sajad||Mahdi Karbalai||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|65||Kata’ib waad ullah||Sami al-Masoudi, deputy of the head of the Shiite Waqf||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|66||Kata’ib al-Ghawth al-Adham||Firas Al-Allaq||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani|
|67||Kata’ib of Babylon||Ryan Chaldean||Iraq-Baghdad belt||Christian movement|
It is clear from this table that each faction of the factions of the popular crowd has its organizational structure and its leader, and work yard, and religious marja. the Square of military activity in most of them is Iraq and some of them are also active militarily in Syria in support of President Bashar al-Assad, and also the religious marja for most of them is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. There is also a Christian faction which represents that the popular crowd is transient to the religious situation in Iraq, and that the face of the organization Daesh is not limited to a specific religion in Iraq.
People crowd is managed by the Shura Council , called “Shura Council of the Islamic Resistance,” and the council comprises of some of the important leaders of the factions affiliated under the name of “popular crowd” and be headed by “Abu Mahdi Mohandes, and Hadi al-Amiri,” and the membership of:
1-Hashim Banyan al-walai, “Abu Alaa,” Secretary General of the kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada.
2-Hadi Qais al-Khazali, Secretary General of the Asaib ahl-al-Haq ( League of the Righteous).
3- Akram Abbas al-Kaabi, Secretary General of the movement of Hezbollah nujaba .
4-Ahmad al-Asadi “Abu Jaafar al-Assadi,” Secretary General of the Movement of Jund of the Imam.
5-Hassan al-Sari , commander Saraya al- Jihad of the Islamic Supreme Council.
6-Hajji shibl al- Zaidi, Secretary General of the kataib of Imam Ali.
7-Hassan munis al- abodi , kataib of Iraqi Hezbollah .
8-Ali Yasiri, commander of Saraya al-Khorasani.
- Adnan Ormad al-shahmani , commander of Saraya of Tayyar al-Risali .
10- Mueen al-Kazimi , member of the Shura Council, the Badr Organization.
The aim of forming this council is to issue decisions that belong to the popular crowd in terms of training or arming that is to consider the Council is primarily responsible for all matters relating to it without consulting to the Prime Minister or the official responsible of the crowd Faleh al-Fayad.
there are spokespersons in its name for this crowd , the following are their names:
1-Joseph al-kalabi , spokesman for the security of the popular crowd.
2-Karim Douhi al-Nuri , official spokesman of the popular crowd – in charge of media office of the Organization of Al-Bader .
3-Ahmed Al-Asadi “Abu Jaafar al-Assadi,” the official spokesman for the crowd , Secretary general of the movement of Jund al-Imam.
4-Hassan Ismail al-Moussawi, in charge of the public relations for the popular crowd.
Because the battle of the popular crowd against al Daesh not just a military battle, but a large part of which is media also so all channels of the blocks and the Shiite parties linked to Iran became at the disposal of the body of war information of the popular crowd in order to broadcast all military operations in all sectors and all these satellite channels are under the command of pasim al-Saadi , the Director General of the Information office of the kataib of Iraqi Hezbollah .
the existence of the leadership for the crowd did not prevent from being individual remarks and actions from each faction affiliated under the banner of the popular crowd and the goal is for the purpose of showing the strength of this faction in the Iraqi arena for the service of personal and individual interests for this faction where you see in all parts of the Iraqi capital Baghdad, pictures of the dead of each faction with pictures of its leader.
In spite of the popular crowd consists of sixty-seven armed factions, however, 80% percent of the military effort is the responsibility of Saraya al-Salam, the Badr brigades , the Hezbollah kataib of Iraq, and Asaib ahl-al-Haq ( the League of the Righteous). The following is a summary a bout those factions that form the cornerstone of the popular crowd.
The new name chosen by the Mahdi Army for itself, the armed wing of the Sadrist current led by Muqtada al-Sadr. Mahdi Army was formed in July 2003 after the assassination of the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim. His name was derived from the awaited Mahdi , Twelfth Imam of Shiites . Mahdi Army composed of volunteer members is divided into military units starting from small groups within the faction, composed of fifty fighters, followed by the company of three hundred fighters, and each seven Saraya constitute the regiment. Estimates of the number of elements have amounted to about ten thousand . Mahdi Army engaged in battles against the Americans, including two battles in Najaf and Basra in which it soon was defeated to reach an agreement with the Americans to hand over its weapon to the joint US- IraqiCommission in 2004. Iran was discontent with Saraya Alsalam since it was not controlled by it . So Qassem Soleimani commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard seeks to bring about a split in the inside of it through large fiscal temptation to those affiliated under the Saraya Al-Salam.
It is a faction that it began its activity as the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which was founded by Mohammed Baqir al – Hakim in Iran in 1982 and under the supervision of Tehran during the war with Iraq, and has participated in the war alongside the Iranian troops Badr Corps was entitled (before it was changed to the organization) to follow – up investigations with prisoners of the Iraqi army with Iran, and was charged with murder and torture in detention camps. Estimates indicate that the number of its members before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was somewhere between 10 and 15 thousand, and soon that number rose to levels that are tens of thousands (some statistics speak for about one hundred thousand) . later on , it was transformed to the “Badr Organization” headed by the former Minister of transport Hadi al – Amiri. Faction of the Badr was accused to liquidate cadres of the Iraqi elites of scientists, doctors, soldiers and Iraqi Baathists in revenge for the years of conflict with Iran. In 2006 , it was attributed to it crimes against the Sunnis who were killed and arrested and displaced , especially in the province of Diyala. The Badr Organization has a history of conflict with the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army as a war for influence in Iraq , and it is one of the largest supporters of the regime of Bashar al – Assad.
Iraqi Hezbullah Kataib
It is one of the most important and most dangerous Iranian-backed Shiite factions, which the Iranian “Quds Force” undertakes its funding and training, there is no known leadership, however, they are organizational structures represented by the Consultative Council and political council, Jamal Jaafar Ibrahim, or Abu Mahdi Mohandes is seen as responsible for the establishment of this group, which is the strongest military representative of Iran in Iraq, and according to information that Imad Mughniyah, one of the most prominent of the leaders of “Hezbollah,” the Lebanese, shares in the establishment of this armed group.
And the Iranian care of the kataib reveals its commitment of loyalty to the rule of “religious leader” in Iran (Velaval- efaqih), and is working to expand the boundaries of the “Islamic revolution”, they are directly linked to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and the military representative in Iraq, Qassem Soleimani, commander of the “Qods Force”, as well as the use of vocabulary espoused by the Iranian regime in the vision of the West, for example, but not limited , the kataib announced in a statement issued on 04.08.2014 “the people of Iraq today has not a self force by which it could to defend itself ,” to remind by saying, “the experience of resisting the arrogant powers are still on the ground present in his hands to provide it with strength and fortitude. ” Also it has ties to the Lebanese Hezbollah, since its members are trained in Lebanon of courses on planting improvised explosive devices, and training to coordinate the attacks of small and medium weapons, and sniper attacks and mortar fire, and rocket attacks.
the “Hezbollah Kataib” donot follow certain parties from Shiite parties, and therefore classified themselves as “Islamic resistance” derived the nature of their work and mechanisms of this kind, that the first military operations carried out by the militia against US forces in Iraq, was on October 23 2003 and under the name Kataib “Abu al Fadl Abbas’ , to merge then with other armed groups funded by Iran, such as:” Kataib of Karbala “, the” Kataib of Zaid bin Ali, Kataib of Ali Akber and kataib Al-Sajad “, noting that each one had been working independently from each other and without learning something about the other kataib, until it was announced about its integration and fight under the one name which is the “Kataib of Hezbollah” during a statement published by the Kataib in the August 21 2007.
Kataib managed in 2010 to develop Katyusha rockets and production of new missiles which are “Zulfikar , Karar and Haider,” and used against US bases, in the January 5, 2011, it differs in its armament from the rest of the other factions, being to manufacture weapons by themselves, as well as arsenal of weapons that gained from stores of the Iraqi army after the US occupation of the country in 2003. This means possession of logistical , technical and scientific capabilities that enable them to manufacture some weapons of various kinds .
The arsenal owned by the kataib includes a variety of weapons including: Kalashnikov “AK-47”, pistols and the “M16” and the “PKC” and rocket projectiles RPG-7 and snipers B29, HS-50 and mortar from 60 to 180 mm and Katyusha rockets and “Strala” to resist-aircraft and unilateral, bilateral and quartet guns , and small launchers mounted on the ground and moving on wheels.
Fighters of Kataib had experience in using various improvised explosive devices, which were used heavily against US forces, as well as the engineers and technicians of kataib managed to manufacture new weapons, such as Ashtar missiles, which they developed it later on , and they made missiles of Zulfikar and Karar, which are more powerful in the destruction , explosion and speed, and control of the propulsion to distances whether they are close or far away.
Asaib Ahl-Al –Haq (League of the Righteous )
Asaib of Ahl-Ahl-Haq ( League of the Righteous ) Movement, or so-called by its supporters, “the Islamic Resistance in Iraq” came out from the womb of the Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr, and was founded by Qais al-Khazali by the former leader of the Sadrist current . he was split from the Sadr’s Mehdi Army in 2004 after a year of American occupation of Iraq to establish a movement private to him . When the fighting was stopped after the ceasefire agreement of Mahdi Army signed with the Iraqi government and the US army , Khazali has continued to give orders to continue to fight without consultation to Sadr.
But things returned to normal state between the leadership of this movement and Muqtada al-Sadr in the reconciliation took place a mid-2005, but after less than a year, ” Asaib Ahl-Al-Haq – League of the Righteous,” emerged as agroup working independently fully from the Mahdi Army after the announcement of Sadr to dissolve and replace it with ” kataib of al-Youm-al-Mawud ( promised day”) and demanded ” Asaib ahl-al-Haq to join to him but it refused. Asaib ahl-al-HaqThe receive training and arms from the Qods Force that belongs to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Alasaib announced that it has implemented six thousand operation targeting the US military and Iraqi forces, including operations of the kidnapping of foreigners , but the most prominent attack of them was in the December 20 / January 2007 in the city of Karbala when they stormed an Iraqi police station that there was inside it a US joint security unit and killed a US soldier and abducted four others who have killed them later. After the attack, the US army launched a campaign on the group and killed the mastermind of the Karbala attack Azhar al-Dulaimi in Baghdad, and the arrest of many of the group’s leaders, including Qais al-Khazali. Asaib ahl-al-Haq has responded to the arrest of kidnapping five Britons from one of the premises of the Ministry of Finance in central Baghdad. The captives are Peter Moore, an expert from the company “BearingPoint” for management working for the US government, and four security guards of the company, “Garda World” Canadian security who were with him. As the guards died during the kidnapping. In January the Iraqi government released of Qais al-Khazali in exchange for the release of Asaib ahl- al-Haq of the British hostage, “Peter Moore.”
Qais al-Khazali , the Secretary General of Asaib ahl-al-Haq is to be considered among the most opposed ones to the division of Iraq and its unity. And his organization has a large political finance , it has one representative in the Iraqi parliament, who is Hassan Salem, as the Asaib ahl-al-Haq League has a satellite channel speaking in their name, it is the Al-Ahd channel .
After the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011, Asaib ahl-Haq surpassed its country’s geography to send its members to fight in Syria under the pretext of “defending the shrine of Sayeda Zeinab,” and its elements affiliated under the banner of “Abou El Fadl Abbas” rampant in Rif of Damascus, specifically in the areas surrounding the shrine .
In addition to these armed factions there is an Iraqi organization which is no less importance than them, it is an Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council, noting that the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq was established in 1982 in Iran, and then transferred in 2003 to Iraqi Islamic Supreme Council. The council aims to be a framework that includes all Shiite factions operating in the political field and formerly led by Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Baqer al-Hakim and mostly in the Supreme Council Members are Iraqis fled to Iran during the first Gulf War. Personality of Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim represents a pivotal role in determining the positions of the Council and political activity and within the components of Islamic Supreme Council is a military wing known as the Badr Corps, which dissented from the council later on. After the killing of Mr. Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim , the presidency of the council was moved to his brother , Mr. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, and after the latter’s death in 2009 his son, Ammar al-Hakim was elected president but central Shura remains representing the leading body and decision-center. Ammar al-Hakim is the grandson of the religious Marja( authority), Grand Ayatollah Mohsen al-Hakim, the Shiite Marja in Iraq dead in 1970. The leaders of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq are known by the Iraqi society, and this council is characterized in control of its members, since it has not been charged with any errors or crimes committed by it
In addition to this survey of the popular crowd in Iraq , the rawabet center l for Research and Strategic Studies conducted in various Iraqi provinces an opinion poll concerning elections, on provincial council elections, and the House of Representatives, which will hold in the years 2017, and 2018 m respectively, and this poll show a fierce competition will be intensified between Saraya al-Salam and the Badr Corps and kataib of Iraqi Hezbollah and the Asaib ahl- al-HaqLeague on the seats of these councils since it is anticipated that these factions will get half of the seats in parliament and provincial councils.
The question in this context, what is the future of the popular crowd in Iraq after Daesh? Would it be merged in state institutions or to develop a body of its own? The continuation of the popular crowd in Iraq after Daesh may increase the Iraq’s internal and external crises , Internally , we can talk here that the continuance of it would increase the burden on Iraq’s Finance especially the Iraqi state since years ago is suffering from a severe financial crisis due to the decline in global oil prices which reflected directly on the government sector because the Iraqi government has become unable to pay salaries to half of its staff, and is no doubt the government will double the deficit with the addition of more than 100 thousand element of the popular crowd at Iraq’s institutions. The Matter here is not confined only to the salaries of those elements, but also the need of the military supplies and financial allocations for media channels as well. This financial crisis has been accompanied by a security crisis in Iraq, noting the factions that make up the popular crowd and that has been integrated into the Iraqi state institutions, but it effectively will continue to receive orders from its organizational leadership and not government Each knows that those particular factions “Saraya al-Salam, Kataib of Iraqi Hezbollah and the Asaib ahl-al-Haq , the Badr Corps “in control of certain parts of the Iraqi capital Baghdad and the provinces of Shiite component , and these factions have the ammunition and weapons making their control seems actual division of the areas that they control as if we were in front of the case ” the kings of communities that prevailed in the state of Andalusia as conflicts and wars between them led to the fall of Andalusia and this may be repeated in Iraq after Daesh and postmodern world as faction leaders in Iraq will become emirs of communities, including disagreements and conflicts among them may lead Iraq to the brink of the abyss, and what demonstrates the validity of this hypothesis as the armed factions already fought in armed conflicts among themselves in the south of Iraq.
On the external level that the continuation of the popular crowd in Iraq after Daesh and its political, military, security and media and economic weight and a link of the main factions as it is well known to the Iranian regime and control of this regime on Iraq since 2006 and to this day, it may make of the popular crowd as a reserve army to the Iranian regime in Iraq and be a tool for this system to intervene in Arab affairs to destabilize it, so it is no wonder that some factions of the popular crowd will be sent after getting rid of the Daesh in Iraq to Syria to support Bashar al-Assad, and send it also to some of the Arab Gulf states, here is the disaster that have been taken place in Iraq first and Secondly in Arab region taking into the consideration that the Iranian regime in this case hits the Arabs with Arabs, taking advantage from this beating. This is not what we hope for.
No one can deny the positive role of the popular crowd in fighting the terrorist organization Daesh and its serious contribution with Iraqi forces and the international coalition in the “liberation” of Iraq from it , and this role was respected by all and raise the hat to it , including the rawabet Centre for Research and Strategic Studies, but once to turn the page of the terrorist Daesh in Iraq , it assumes to turn the page on the popular crowd also that requires from the religious Marja ( authority) once the liberation of Iraq from terrorist al Daesh to issue a religious Fatwa to stop “Jihad Ulkipaia” so as not to let the popular crowd to continue working based on the opinion previously issued by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, so to stop the fatwa means to lift sacredness about the factions of the popular crowd and return to their natural lives before the emergence of al Daesh in Iraq, to maintain a unified Iraq.
Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies