Researcher Shatha Khalil
More than four years after the war in Ukraine began, many believed that Europe had succeeded in turning the page on its historic dependence on Russian gas. Russia’s share of European gas imports fell sharply, while the European Union expanded imports from the United States, Norway, and Qatar and invested heavily in liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure and renewable energy. However, developments in the summer of 2026 have reopened a critical question: Has Europe truly freed itself from dependence on Russia, or has it simply replaced direct dependence with a more complex and costly set of risks?
Belgium provides a striking example. In July 2026, Russia was the sole supplier of Belgium’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, supplying approximately 400,000 tonnes, even as the European Union prepares to completely ban Russian LNG. This does not mean that Belgium relied entirely on Russia for its overall gas needs, as it continued receiving pipeline gas from Norway and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the situation exposes an important contradiction between European political decisions and market realities.
Europe Has Changed Its Dependence, Not Eliminated It
Before 2022, Russian gas accounted for around 40% of EU gas imports, with pipelines delivering enormous volumes to European markets, particularly to Germany and energy-intensive industries.
Following the war, Europe succeeded in significantly diversifying its energy sources. However, a substantial portion of Russian pipeline gas was replaced by LNG transported by sea.
Here lies the paradox.
Europe has reduced the risks associated with dependence on a single supplier, but it has become more exposed to volatility in the global LNG market.
An LNG tanker heading toward Europe can be redirected to Asia if prices there become more attractive. Similarly, disruptions in the Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz can reduce global supplies and increase European gas prices, even when individual European countries do not directly import gas from the affected region.
Europe has therefore partly shifted from Russian supplier risk to global market risk.
The Strait of Hormuz Brings Russia Back Into the Equation
The Middle East disruptions of 2026 clearly exposed this vulnerability. The Strait of Hormuz is a crucial route for global energy trade, and any disruption to LNG tanker traffic through the strait increases competition for the remaining available cargoes.
When supply declines, buyers’ calculations change.
Under normal market conditions, Europe can give greater priority to political and strategic considerations when choosing suppliers. During periods of shortages and high prices, however, three factors become increasingly important: availability, speed of delivery, and price.
This is where Russian gas returns to the equation—not because Europe has strategically decided to return to Moscow, but because market conditions can make available Russian gas more valuable during a supply crisis.
This is precisely why the Belgian case matters: Russia has not regained its dominance, but it has demonstrated that it can still fill supply gaps left by other producers.
The Greater Risk Is Not Gas Shortages, but Price
Europe’s challenge is not simply securing enough gas for the winter. The deeper economic issue is the cost of energy to the European economy.
Gas is not merely a fuel used to heat homes. It is a crucial input for industry, electricity generation, chemicals, fertilizers, glass, metals, and other sectors.
If European energy prices remain higher than those of its competitors for an extended period, the problem shifts from an energy crisis to a competitiveness crisis.
European companies do not compete only with one another. They compete against businesses operating in the United States, China, the Middle East, and Asia. If production costs in Europe become structurally higher, new industrial investment may increasingly move toward regions where energy is cheaper.
In that case, the economic cost of abandoning Russian gas could become much greater than the value of the gas itself.
Can Russia Regain Its Former Dominance?
Probably not.
The European Union has made a strategic and legal decision to phase out Russian gas. In January 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted rules providing for the gradual elimination of Russian gas imports, targeting a complete ban on Russian LNG from 2027 and the termination of Russian pipeline gas imports later that year, subject to transitional arrangements for existing contracts.
A return to Russia’s pre-war market share of around 40% therefore appears unlikely.
But that does not mean Moscow has lost all of its influence.
In energy markets, power is determined not only by market share but also by the ability to provide the additional supply the market needs at a moment of scarcity.
Russia might eventually account for only 5% or 10% of a particular market. Yet if that supply is what closes the gap between demand and available supply during a crisis, its influence on prices could be far greater than its market share suggests.
This may become Russia’s new strategic advantage: a shift from dominant supplier to influential marginal supplier.
The Battle of 2027
The year 2027 will represent a major test for Europe’s energy strategy.
If the Russian gas ban takes effect at a time when large volumes of American, Qatari, and other LNG supplies are available, renewable energy capacity is expanding, and European gas demand is declining, the transition away from Russia may occur at a manageable economic cost.
But if the ban coincides with continuing instability in the Middle East, low European gas storage levels, and intense Asian competition for LNG cargoes, prices could rise significantly. At that point, the debate within Europe would become as much economic as political.
The central question would no longer be:
Do we want Russian gas?
Instead, it would become:
What price is Europe prepared to pay to ensure that it no longer needs it?
Conclusion
What happened in Belgium does not signal the return of Russian energy dominance in Europe, but it carries an important economic message.
Europe has succeeded in reducing its dependence on Russia, but it has not yet succeeded in making the absence of Russian gas economically cost-free.
That distinction matters.
Until 2030, the success of Europe’s energy strategy should not be measured solely by the decline in Russian imports. It should also be measured by Europe’s ability to secure reliable energy at prices that preserve the competitiveness of European industry.
If Europe succeeds in diversifying its suppliers while expanding renewable energy, storage capacity, and energy infrastructure, Russia will gradually lose one of its most important sources of economic leverage over Europe.
But if every disruption in the global LNG market either pushes Europe back toward Russian supplies or causes sharp increases in energy prices, Moscow may lose its historic share of the European market while retaining something almost as important:
the ability to influence the economic cost of Europe’s independence from Russia.
Economic Unit – North America Office
Al-Rawabit Center for Research and Strategic Studies