With changing of the regional balances of powers in the Middle East as a result of the change in the shape of the political system and its nature of a number of Arab countries, especially with the regional heavyweights in the region in the wake of what has become known in the media as the “Arab Spring”, and the consequent rise of a current of political Islam to power, noting that there was nothing new in the presence of regional and international competition to play a greater role in the region, but what is new is the desire of the Iranian regime to carry out the role of the emerging middle powers as a superpower in the regional system despite internal economic , political, and social challenges in Iran.
First of all we have to indicate to what is the regional power, and what is the relationship between each of the regional power and medium powers for the international system? It is necessary to clarify the idea of the medium power basically , and the distinction between traditional middle powers ,and the emerging medium power which can be referred to as regional powers.
Regional Power is the international unit, which has the power, and the ability to influence within the borders of its territory, they are similar to the major powers in the international system, but on the level of its territory only. The difference between the traditional medium power and rising “regional ” power is the international unit’s ability to lead in the foundation, the regional “emerging middle” power is enjoying such skill, while the traditional medium power lacks the element of leadership ,so its role is limited on the formation of coalitions, as well as to come out with a compromise solutions based basically on the principle of partnership to achieve common interests. ”
The Iranian regime today stands at a crossroads with respect to trying to achieve its regional influence, since it crossed the middle of the road towards the implementation of its objectives , and as it was negotiating secretly with the Western system 12 years ago about its nuclear program, the Iranian regime was not away from the regional shifts in the Middle East; it was a key actor in it , especially after the US occupation of Iraq in April / May 2003, and because of this occupation, the Iranian regime was able to return to its sectarian depth, where its influence penetrated to the inside of the Iraqi state institutions, and invested it too politically and militarily in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, and that the Revolutionary Guard was able to play a pivotal role in the production of Iran’s external political role and activate it through enhancing the role of armed militias in the wide geopolitics , including the Shiite component in its demographics.
In Syria, the Iranian regime has invested its relations with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in order to reach in its influence to the coast of the eastern Mediterranean with the help of the Lebanese Hezbollah militia and Khamenei , Murshed of the Iranian revolution believes that the loss in Syria could contribute to break the link with him which he considered it the fighting hand for him within the Arab countries and in Yemen , the Iranian regime supports the rebels of Houthis politically and militarily and this support of Iran has multiple dimensions represented in the sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites in the region in addition to the cold war and the proxy war between Saudi Arbia and the Gulf states on the one hand and the Iranian regime on the other hand as well as the latter sought to expand its influence in the region where it is always trying to destabilize the Gulf’s stability by moving the Shiite Arms existed there to threaten the security of the Gulf states and the creation of a permanent state of unrest to drain capabilities of countries in the region, so the Houthis had become of the main arms upon which the Iranian regime depends to create hotbeds of tension and conflict in the Arbian Gulf ,so the success of the Houthis in tightening its firm grip on Yemen and extend their control over the entire country will encourage citizens who are Shiites in Saudi Arabia , Bahrain and the UAE to follow them and come out against the ruling regimes to achieve the strategic goal of the Iranian regime in the funeral of the Arabian Gulf and join it to its territory. This is supported by what some officials say from the Iranian regime that the Houthis are copy of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which confirms the project to export the revolution of velayat-e faqih in its regional environment.
In order to achieve its regional Crescent , the Iranian regime relied on the two factors the first: the hard power, including
- Provide training, technical and financial support to the opposition: such as providing financial support up to $ 100 million a year to Hezbollah in Lebanon, and sending trained security groups that had overseen on the providing of technical , and training professional support to the Syrian security forces , and the training of Hezbollah parties of GCC which are exported to the Arab Gulf countries ; to cause troubles there, as happened in Bahrain and Kuwait, to change the systems of governance of it. And such support for the popular crowd Authority in Iraq, leading to increase its influence there.
- support the opposition, and Shiite groups militarily: As in Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the rest of the Arab Gulf states, and the most prominent example of this is Iran’s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon ,and the Shiite parties, groups that are pro-Iran in Iraq of weapons, such as the group’s Qods Force in Iraq , with weapons and munitions such as anti-tank missiles, mortars, and missiles 107 mm 0.122 mm, etc., and provide modern weapons, missiles and ammunition and military equipment, including anti-tank missiles and anti-aircraft missiles, and implementation of infrastructure of the defense infrastructure of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
As the Iranian regime can direct its agents to multiple battlefields if there is a necessary for it, and sending the Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi and Afghan Shiite groups to war in Syria are examples of this, and the Iranian regime, as the Iranian regime do not keep these groups for use in the event of a general war only but to get benefit of it in punishing other parties.
- The pursuit of possession of a nuclear weapon: the Iranian regime worked to develop nuclear technology capabilities which are able to produce nuclear weapons, by increasing the size of enriched uranium, and the rise of the percentage of enrichment to 90% or higher, and making it possible to get the quantity needed to make nuclear weapons, and it is indirect tool working to increase Iran’s ability to increase its influence in the region, in addition it is a tool being used in policy which depends on the threat and coercion but on the other hand, it is an attraction factor for a system which possesses nuclear weapons, because it gives the state an attraction factor too. In spite of the nuclear agreement, which came into force in January of the last year, it does not seem that it will make a change in the regional policy of the Iranian regime, and will not stop it from continuing in its presence in the arena classified by Iran as an important places for it like:
Syria , Iraq, and Yemen , so it is supposed not go far in optimism on this level expecting an Iranian role less in the conflict fronts as the agreement does not include terms that cast in this direction .
The Iranian regime has also relied on soft power, and perhaps the most prominent forms of the principle of exporting the revolution, following the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Iranian regime adopted that principle in accordance with the two approaches, namely the first is to export the revolution with intent to cause a real revolution in neighboring countries in Iraq’s Baathist and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, relying on the Shiite population in those countries, so that a Shiite doctrine in the early days of the revolution constituted a global intellectual base, through the slogan. “all of the land is Karbala and every day is Ashura” In the next stage Shi’ism emerged as the doctrine is intended to influence the Shiite communities. In the final stage and with the take over of Shiites ,who were surrounded and influenced , to the reins of power in the areas where they are located, they have been motivated in order to establish the rule similar to that set up by the Iranian regime, to re-invoke the intellectual side of the culture, and Iraq is the most prominent example of this. While the other approach :it is called the theory of the mother continent based on the idea of exporting a culture revolution concentrating on the principles of the revolution in stead of exporting the revolution itself.
The second factor is that the Iranian regime strengthened its international alliances with the Russian state as a counterweight to US pressure and the machine of war that burns the earth at large Syrian military opposition and its regional allies, and as a support for the forces backed by the Iranian regime as the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Brigades of the Revolutionary Guard and militias loyal to it , and also benefited from the alliance with Russia in consolidating the Syrian regime, and implementation of demographic separation plan in Syria and fencing areas of its influence with the sectarian forces that constitute the base of its control in it, and this task has not yet been completed, and needs more military conflict and clearing certain areas within the project inside Syria. However the Iranian regime has not yet reaped any fruits of its movements in the region, and remains at a standstill in the “middle of the road,” leaving behind the blood shed and innocent remains and sectarian war and scorched earth, and the destruction of social structure in the “crescent” of its ambitions in: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.
In an attempt to understand this aggressive behavior of the Iranian regime, we wonder: What is the nature of the danger that was threatening the existence of the Iranian regime to resort to take actions that threaten the stability of the entire region? Answer: No risk, especially after the overthrow of the rule of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime, the lack of serious attention by the former US President Barack Obama’s administration of the territory issues, as the main interest of it was centered on reaching a diplomatic settlement of the Iranian nuclear project, and Israel geographically is far away from the Iranian regime and the impossibility to take military action against it, and the first who will prevent it is the Americans who do not want to give the Iranian regime an opportunity to undermine security and stability in the Arabian Gulf, and to stop the supply of oil, as it is for the countries of the Arabian Gulf are following policies that are not hostile toward the Iranian regime that can improve its relations with them , but it seems that Iran is not keen on the required extent .
By doing this it is clear that the Iranian regime is an opportunistic force wanted to take advantage of the geopolitical vacuum created by the US occupation of Iraq, and to benefit from the course of the Arab Spring to confirm its dominance in the neighboring countries without resorting to direct the war, relying on the proxy war, and in this context we wonder if the Iranian regime is a rational ? Which makes its decisions based on the interest, or based on ideological lines? Intellectual systems are moving based on previous beliefs, and religious and intellectual convictions interfere dramatically in the decision-making process, especially in foreign policy, and be irrational, perhaps even offering to commit suicide or mutual destruction, if necessary; to achieve those intellectual and religious goals. There are assessments that the Iranian regime is an intellectual, it will only accept what would bring him the intellectual objectives, especially the export of the Iranian revolution, and call the historical feuds between Sunnis and Shiites, as a holy mission embedded in Shiite mentality that runs from the sense with the oppression , in addition to that the hostility “to the Sunnis” is historic and existence hostility that does not accept compromises, and does not accept utilitarian “pragmatism” of self-interest. While other assessments stating that the Iranian regime is a rational system, with evidence that it did not aim Israel directly, even once in its history, but cooperated with the United States in a deal for the supply of weapons during the war with Iraq mediated by an Israeli in 1985, what was known as the scandal of Iran-Contra and that the ally of the Iranian regime is the Russian state, a state that does not agree with him on values, religion or ideology; and this stating that the Iranian regime does not move driven by ideology or religious doctrine, but in the end achieves its supreme interests based on its beneficial values .
But there is another explanation, is that the Iranian regime combines between the utilitarian and intellectual values , and used them in turn to achieve all of its interests and religious faith, as interests are serving thought, which is a fundamental goal for it that Iran is not ashamed of its declaration explicitly, a control on the territory of the Levant, and to extend his influence on the Islamic world in the end with its Shiite sectarianism , beginning in fragile states fallen in the wars of former US President George W. Bush in both Afghanistan and Iraq, all the way to Syria, where the Iranian regime supported Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime, and boasted that he now controls several Arab capitals .From this standpoint, the Iranian regime allied with Russia, making the nuclear deal with the West, led by the United States to re-integrate into the global system; which prompted Gen. Martin Dempsey, the American former chief of staff to say that the Iranian regime is a “rational player,” noting that his convictions which concluded to build on the many data, it was the most important of the recent rapprochement between the United States under former President Barack Obama and the Iranian regime, and what Dempsey called the path which is the most rational for the United States; while the US intelligence describes it irrational; because of the method of decision-making and religious literature used by in his speeches, while other intelligence estimates of the United States also asserted in 2007 that “the Iranian decision-driven by approach to profit and loss, not scrambling toward acquiring nuclear weapons, regardless of the military, economic and political costs.”So there is disagreement within the American intelligence community; but within the Ministry of Defense itself on the characterization of the Iranian regime and the method of decision-making process, especially critical strategic process, such as obtaining a nuclear weapon.
Through the combination that combines rational with the thinking of the Iranian regime, we can say that the current moves, which uses that duplication very skillfully, not in accordance with the system of values ruling the Iranian vision, but depending on the antagonist that it is dealing with; it deals in a hard thought with the sectarian conflicts in the region while dealing very rationally with the major powers, led by Russia, the EU and the United States, and used that dual relationship in its own interests, which aims eventually to realize the idea, and it used the thought and sectarian emotion inside Iran in order to justify foreign interventions, which burn the limited economic resources of the Iranian state in an attempt to achieve its intellectual, doctrinal objectives covered by the sectarian cover when it comes to go to external battles far from areas near its borders under the pretext of defending the holy shrines in Syria, and using extremist organizations in the region as a smokescreen to hide behind it the Expansionist ambitions to dominate the region Levant.
However, the leading countries in the region felt, particularly Saudi Arabia, of the disastrous results of the mentality of the sectarian regime and the Iranian influence in the political, and social infrastructure in the region and specifically in the September 21 -2014 where al-Houthi groups took control on the government and ministers and strategic headquarters based in Sana’a , and in march 26 2015, the response has come on such control as a dozen countries started a military operation led by Susi Arbia called as the decisive storm against the Houthi groups and the forces of ousted President Ali Abd ullah Saleh, this process was criticized widely by the Iranian regime because the decisive storm surprised it in addressing to its influence in Yemen
Saudi Arabia, did not rely in that military alliance on the Arab Gulf states only, in which Sultanate of Oman declined to participate in it , but included others such as Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, in the knowledge that the Iranian regime has been workeing on the fragmentation of the Gulf countries following the policy of bilateral agreements , and deals with each state separately, according to its position and its relationship with it noting that it signs a security agreements with the Gulf state, and opens secret talks with other Gulf state, and sends messages of political and economic contents to the third Gulf state. Moreover, Saudi Arabia considered the Iranian regime is the fundamental reason behind the instability in the region, and the official sponsor of sectarian conflict after intervening in the affairs of the region by participating in proxy wars and therefore the efforts to revive the Islamic alliance involving the symbolism represented mainly in the construction of a united front against its threat regionally.
Therefore, the Iranian regime believes that the failure to neutralize Pakistan’ “nuclear country” and Egypt with Arab heavyweights in its struggle with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would harm its expansion project in the Levant, could that system to neutralize them in his struggle with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia? After making sure that the recent alliance of Saudi Arabia with Turkey failed to reach concrete results, in addition to about the size of economic cooperation in the field of energy between the Iranian regime and Turkey, which contributes as much as possible to neutralize their political differences.
For Pakistan , there are many of the commonalities between it and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as each of them in the vanguard of the Muslim world, but Pakistan’s accession to the Islamist alliance led by Saudi Arabia, will put it in an embarrassing position with the Iranian regime. While Pakistan, the second Muslim countries in terms of population was unable on turning its back to the country of the Two Holy Mosques, it can not also be risking in its relations with it since it has borders with Iran . Despite the common interests that unite between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, in turn share with Iranian regime in many of the cultural, linguistic and religious links . In addition, Pakistan hosts the second largest proportion of the Shiite community in the world, despite being a country with a Sunni majority. And thus to maintain smooth relations with the Iranian regime, a a home to the largest number of Shiites in the world represents a top priority for Islamabad.
Which stimulates the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on a quest to win a Pakistani military support, as Pakistan is the only official nuclear power in the Islamic world , and has the sixth-largest army in the world, and it is an advantage to any military alliance. Add to that the historical data that brings them regardless of religious convergence. Over the past decades, Pakistan has shown willingness to provide assistance to Saudi Arabia. And manifested in the context of the support given by Pakistan to Riyadh in the incident, the occupation of the Haram al-Sharif in 1979 at the hands of militants, as Pakistan deployed troops to protect Saudi Arabia during the Iran-Iraq war. Furthermore, the personal relations between the leaders of two countries, and political and security relations are very powerful, when the current chief of government of Nawaz Sharif was ousted from office in 1999, he found a comfortable exile in Saudi Arabia, so he was allowed to return to his country in 2007. The nuclear dossier has a prominent role in the strengthening of relations since the Kingdom has provided Pakistan with generous financial support for the “Islamic nuclear bomb.” It is noteworthy that the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan as a result of conducting nuclear tests, but Riyadh has provided the necessary material support to Pakistan to ease the impact of sanctions, as given to it in addition to money a crude oil. Accordingly, the estimates suggest that the Saudi support to Pakistan in building its nuclear capability means that the latter will respond to Saudi Arabia when requested to use Pakistan’s nuclear or traditional capabilities.
However, the winds of Pakistani politics goes, including not consistent with the Saudi orientations when Pakistan refused to engage in military intervention in Yemen in any way. Despite the historic alliance between the two countries, Pakistan has decided not to join the Arab coalition to fight the tide of al-Huthi in Yemen, which receives support from Iran. One of the reasons for rejection is that Pakistani fears of sectarian tensions inside it, because it includes a large proportion of Shiites affected by Iran, along with the pursuit of Pakistan to maintain economic relations with Iran, especially in terms of heavy file on the electricity crisis, as the Pakistani army is busy to protect and control its borders with India and Afghanistan, and it appears that it did not interested in opening a new front. This along with the common interests between Iran and Pakistan in the repression of the Baloch separatist active movement in both countries.
So Pakistan is trying to maintain its strategic relations with Saudi Arabia, a country that opened its doors to thousands of Pakistani workers provide historical support to Islamabad. However, the Iranian regime, which seeks to penetrate in the region and aimed at the national security of the Arab Gulf and Levant puts Pakistan in a difficult task that requires a balance between the common ties with Saudi Arabia, and what is imposed by economic pressure and sectarian prejudices that to hinder its alliance with Riyadh.
As for Egypt, the Iranian regime is trying to recruit the tension in Egyptian-Saudi historical relations to serve its interests, and this tension has appeared when Egypt’s delegate votes in the UN Security Council in / October last year on the draft resolution, which is consistent with Russian interests in Syria. Voting has highlighted the differences in points of view of the Egypt and Saudi Arabia towards the Syrian conflict. Al-Riyadh fear that the steadfastness of Bashar al-Assad lead to the consolidation of the power of rival President of the Iranian regime, while Cairo fears from the Sunni Islamic organizations , most involved in fighting against him, based on its caution from their own battles against Islamic organizations (with the death toll resulting from this recent fighting much less ). Cairo was clear in this difference of strategic point of views as its minister of foreign affairs , Samih Shukri pointed out after meeting with his Iranian counterpart in the last September saying that the coalition which is involved in the war in Syria may want to change the system in the country but this is not the position of Egypt.
Against this, the Saudi response to this Egyptian position has not delayed as the General Petroleum Authority informed verbally early November / last October to stop supply of petroleum materials. Saudi Resolution whether it has come a due to the backdrop of the diplomatic crisis between the two countries, or on the background of the economic crisis faced by the Riyadh, in all cases, it is undeniable that their relations during the recent period were prevailed by a tense and apathy. Instead of the Yemeni file that Saudi Arabia expects the largest support of Cairo , the agreement of islands of Tiran and Sanafir came , which the court ruled of its invalidity . The Grozny conference which was attended by 200 Sunni scientists from various Arab and Islamic countries which has been organized in Chechnya, within the data of crisis; especially after angering Saudi Arabia because of an exception the scientists of it, where the conference was attended by an Egyptian delegation headed by Sheikh Al-Azhar, Dr. Ahmed Al-Tayeb, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Shawki Allam and adviser to the president, Ali Gomaa, and Osama al-Azhari, which sparked harsh criticism emerged from Saudi Arabia.
Because the misfortunes of some people are advantages to others , the Iranian regime entered to the line of diplomatic crisis between Egypt and Saudi Arabia across the Iraqi gate , in order to avoid the crisis of Egypt due to the cut of Saudi oil supplies , Egypt headed towards Iraq, as the latter has agreed to provide it with oil in exchange for giving oil derivations and weapons and ammunition from Egypt and under the bless of the of Iranian regime Iraq signed this agreement noting that the oil file has become one of the prominent phenomena of dependency of Baghdad to the Iranian regime and this was appeared clearly finally in the OPEC meetings and efforts to cut production . The decision to give Iraq oil to Egypt is a political decision more than being an economic decision and it came in response to Saudi Arabia before everything. There is no doubt that the Saudi Egyptian disagreement does not serve the Arab issues, on the contrary, it makes it worse and it casts in the favor of the interest of the Iranian regime, which is breathing a sigh of relief when it saw two Arab pivotal countries as Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the case of a schism, and may work on nutrition of it by all possible means , and at this level , the Iranian regime will not stop at the neutralization of Egypt in his struggle with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but will use all diplomatic and economic cards, whether direct or indirect ways to get this Arab heavyweights to his side. If the Iranian – Egyptian convergence was achieved , it would mean an Arab vulnerable without equal in front of the Iranian regime in our contemporary history. And it establishes a new phase of conflict and confrontation.
In front of this conflict in Saudi -Iran relations , we can summarize the Iranian regime Options in the Levant, based on fundamental variables in the economic, political and ideological determinants, due to its relationship between the various countries of the region, and can be summarized as follows:
Economic determinant I.: in the light of the drop in oil prices, and the attempt of Hassan Rohani, Iran’s President to diversify sources of income, in light of the increased spending on the Syrian war, in which the Iranian regime spends about $ 6 billion a year, the Iranian state will enter in the case of the faltering of economy, especially that whole sections-after years of sanctions-economic need to inject aplenty of funds , to stand on its feet again, on the top is the oil industry that needs to improve its infrastructure, and spending on a number of refineries and oil refining, to cover the deficit in this important sector as well as the shale oil reserves in the United States and Canada, and the entry of new countries in the competition on the export of gas to Europe, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean fields will cause great pressure on the Iranian economy, which relies mainly on oil and gas, as well as the biggest ally of the regime of Iran, which is the Russian Federation, is suffering economically .Therefore, the economic dimension will be the governor of the Iranian political decision with regard to its influence in the region, and the continued support of Bashar al-Assad.
Second – the shift of regional alliances :Russia’s aim of their presence in Syria is to maintain its military bases, and promotion of advanced weapons to maintain its share of the global arms market, the use of Syrian paper to reaffirm the political importance on the international stage, so Russia is the cornerstone of the current Iranian regime’s strategy to dominate the region, using Russia as a baton that it does not already own against its opponents of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, but Russia can at any time swap Bashar al-Assad a deal with NATO concerning the system of Western missile shield, which threatened it, as well as acceptance of NATO to admit Russia to the Crimea, Russia knows that the Iranian regime will remain for a short time follower to it regarding the export of arms, as Russia was able to maintain its bases in Syria under any agreement with both Western and regional powers on the forefront the Arabian Gulf and Turkey, noting that Russia could abandon Bashar al-Assad provided to maintain military and economic interests in a stage after him.
III To turn the flaming conditions between Sunnis and Shiites into a broad sectarian war, and the ruling determinant for this possibility is the failure of the talks, “Astana”, and the escalation of the sectarian war in the region, after the defeat al Daesh and the withdrawal of the United States from the region once again, accompanied by a Russian withdrawal, as the Russia does not bear the attrition of its troops, and to stay in such conditions, without a time limit, as well as without the ability to resolve the situation on the ground once and for all in favor of Bashar al-Assad. Although the withdrawal of the major powers of the region may lead to ignition war between Sunnis and Shiites, and instead of being a proxy war between the two parties, the ignition war could lead to a military land intervention of the Islamic coalition forces from the south, and the similar intervention from the north of the Turkish forces.
This will not cast in the favor of the Iranian regime which can not bear a confrontation against the Sunni coalition that owns the most modern eastern weapons and alarge number of land forces and the call of the Sunni-Shiite conflict will stimulate the Muslim feelings around the world to join in the religious war that its consequences are expected to be catastrophe on the all parties
Note of these options that are negative options as a whole, and do not serve the Middle East region countries and their peoples. With these options the peace, stability and prosperity do not make sense to those countries and their peoples , but there is more chaos and fragmentation, division and get into the midst of sectarian and confessional wars reminiscent of the same wars experienced by Europe in the seventh and tenth century , in which a total outcome was a loss for all. We wonder what is the best for the Iranian regime and the leading countries in the region? Cooperation and competition or conflict?
We believe that the best option for the Iranian regime and the countries of the region all is a return to the borders of joint cooperation, and hence the importance of the Turkish state was appeared that to deal with the Iranian regime in a large “pragmatic” interest, established with it the Turkish –Iran Cooperation Council , where Turkey appeared as a good policeman apparently in a relationship with the Iranian regime, while Saudi Arabia played in the reign of King Salman bin Abdulaziz, the role of wicked policeman , in order to force the Iranian regime to retreat from its destructive strategy , based on a sectarian ideology, which aims to export revolution that was failed largely to comply with its literature, and morality in various conflict zones in the Levant.
Muammar Faisal Kholi
Translated by : Mudhaffar al-Kusairi
Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies